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Abstract
This thesis examines the problem of large computational loads generated by safety re-
lated algorithms for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Eﬃcient and accurate methods
for multiple sensor fault detection and Sense-And-Avoid systems for UAS are proposed.
A novel sensor fault detection method is proposed and tested by simulation. The
method detects multiple sensor faults by evaluating normal and faulty hypotheses for
each sensor sequentially using measurements obtained from sensors on-board the air-
craft. A Six-Degrees-of-Freedom flight model for a Navion aircraft is used to simulate
faulty sensor data to test the fault detection method. The proposed sequential fault
detection method detects faulty sensors, the update process is fast and maintains a
more accurate state-estimate than the parallel fault detection method.
For Sense-And-Avoid systems, an eﬃcient method for estimating the probability of
conflict between traﬃc in a non-cooperative environment is proposed. Estimating low
probabilities of conflict using ‘naive’ Direct Monte Carlo method generates a significant
computational load. The proposed method uses a technique called Subset Simulation
where small failure probabilities are computed as a product of larger conditional failure
probabilities – reducing the computational load whilst improving the accuracy of the
probability estimates. The utility of the approach is demonstrated by modelling a series
of conflicting and potentially conflicting scenarios based on the standard Rules of the
Air specified by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
i
Contents
Abstract i
List of Figures v
List of Tables viii
Acronyms x
Acknowledgements xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Novel Contributions of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Background 5
2.1 Rules and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Flight Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Right of Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.3 Air Traﬃc Service Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4 Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Equivalent Level of Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Sense and Avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Cooperative CD&R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Non-Cooperative CD&R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Navion Flight Model 18
3.1 Axes Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Equations of Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 Aircraft Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
ii
3.2.2 Body-axes to Earth-axes transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.3 Earth-axes to Body-axes transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.4 Gravitational and Thrust Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.5 Navion Aerodynamic coeﬃcients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Flight Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.1 Level flight conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.2 Aircraft State Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.3 Level Flight Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Autopilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.1 Climbing flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.2 Descending flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.3 Turning flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Sensors and State Estimation 42
4.1 Sensor simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.1 Inertial Measurement Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.2 Angle-of-Attack Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1.3 Pitot-static Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 State Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.1 Kalman Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Extended Kalman filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.3 Unscented Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2.4 Augmented Unscented Kalman Filter Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.1 Level flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.2 Climbing flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.3 Descending flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.4 Turning flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Sensor Fault Detection 61
5.1 Sensor Fault simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1.1 Inertial Measurement Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1.2 Angle-of-Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1.3 Pitot-static Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.4 Faulty sensor test scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 Multiple sensor fault detection using sequential UKF Generalized Pseudo
Bayes-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
iii
5.3.1 Level Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3.2 Climbing flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.3 Descending flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.4 Turning flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4 Multiple sensor fault detection using parallel UKF Generalized Pseudo
Bayes-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6 Rare Event simulation 86
6.1 Direct Monte Carlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1.1 Estimating probability of drawing samples from region F . . . . 87
6.2 Metropolis Hastings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2.1 Drawing samples from the region F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3 Subset Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.3.1 Level 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.3.2 Level i > 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.3.3 Estimating Probability of drawing samples from region F . . . . 94
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7 Application of Subset Simulation for Airborne Conflict detection 98
7.1 Test scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.2 Estimating Probability of Conflict using Subset Simulation . . . . . . . 102
7.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.3.1 Estimation of Pc for Head-on Pass scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.3.2 Estimation of Pc for Intruder Overtaking Observer . . . . . . . . 112
7.4 Accuracy and Eﬃciency of Subset Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8 Conclusion and Future Work 119
8.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A Pseudo Code 121
A.1 Navion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Direct Monte Carlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.3 Metropolis Hastings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.4 Subset Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.5 Estimating Probability of Conflict between Air traﬃc . . . . . . . . . . 126
iv
List of Figures
2.1 These figures illustrate the geometric configuration of the diﬀerent con-
flicts that might be encountered within a block of airspace. This includes
diﬀerent manoeuvres required to be executed by the respective parties
to resolve the conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 The Earth-axes and aircraft Body-axes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Aircraft bank 3.2(a) and pitch 3.2(a) orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Longitudinal states for Navion during level flight at 5000 ft (1524m). . . 34
3.4 Longitudinal states for Navion in level flight at 5000ft (1524m) with a
dampened system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5 The aircraft climbs and maintains altitude of 1828.8m (6000ft) and head-
ing 0◦. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6 The aircraft descends and maintains altitude of 1219.2m (4000ft) and
heading 0◦. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.7 The aircraft turns and maintains a heading of 90◦ and altitude of 1219.2m
(4000ft). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 Inertial Measurement Unit [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Two Angle-of-Attack Sensors on Airbus A330 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Two Static ports on Airbus A330 [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Pitot tubes on A330 [4] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 The Unscented Transform – a nonlinear function is applied to a set of
sigma points [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.6 Simulation Flow diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7 Altitude and Heading during level flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.8 Altitude and Heading during climbing flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.9 Altitude and Heading during Descending flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.10 Altitude and Heading during turning flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
v
5.1 The eﬀect of sensor faults on the altitude of the aircraft during the four
common flight modes: Level flight, Ascending flight, Descending flight
and Turning flight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 Flow diagram for UKF-GPB-1 multiple sensor fault detection evaluating
hypotheses sequentially . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during level
flight scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 Fault likelihood for sensors during Level Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during
climbing flight scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.6 Fault likelihood for sensors during Climbing Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.7 Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during de-
scending flight scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.8 Fault likelihood for sensors during descending Flight . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.9 Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during turn-
ing flight scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.10 Fault likelihood for sensors during turning flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.11 Flow diagram for UKF-GPB-1 multiple sensor fault detection using par-
allel hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.12 Simulation flow diagram for sequential and parallel GPB-1 . . . . . . . . 81
5.13 Time taken for measurement update of Parallel vs Sequential implemen-
tation of UKF-GPB-1 Fault detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.14 RMSE of parallel and sequential implementation of GPB-1 sensor fault
detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.15 RMSE of Parallel and Sequential UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection for
100 realisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.1 The probability of drawing samples from the region F is estimated us-
ing Direct Monte Carlo. Figure 6.1(a) estimates the PF = 0 with 100
samples. Figure 6.1(b) estimates the PF = 1.5× 10−4 with 105 samples. 88
6.2 Drawing samples from the region F using Metropolis Hastings algorithm
to generate chains of conditional samples. The initial samples used as
seeds are drawn using Direct Monte Carlo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vi
6.3 Subset Simulation is applied to the problem of estimating the probability
of drawing samples from the region F . Subset Simulation begins with
level 0 by drawing N = 100 samples from a Gaussian distribution centred
at O = [0, 0] using the DMC method as shown in Figure 6.3(a). The
quantity of interest is the distance between each sample and C. These
are plotted against probability intervals to generate a CCDF as shown
in Figure 6.3(b). No samples are within the region F . The SS method
proceeds to level 1 and conditional samples are generated using the MH
method. The Nc level 0 samples are used to generate the conditional
samples shown in Figure 6.3(c). These conditional samples are drawn
progressively closer to the region F until some samples are drawn from
the region F. This is achieved by drawing samples from intermediate
thresholds closer to the boundary of F . The quantity of interest for the
samples are determined and plotted against the probability intervals for
the current level. This CCDF is appended to the previous CCDF by
replacing the samples used as seeds from the previous level as shown in
Figure 6.3(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1 The potentially conflicting scenarios based on the diﬀerent conflicts shown
in Figure 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.2 Head-on pass scenario with 1000m Lateral Separation . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.3 These figures illustrate the application of SS to estimate the Pc(K+1) at
the time-step K + 1 during a Head-on pass between an Observer O(K)
and Intruder U(K) with lateral separation of 1000m. SS begins with level
0 (DMC) where N = 100 samples are drawn from a distribution centred
at the Intruder’s state-estimate Uˆ(K +1) with a covariance of Sˆ(K +1)
obtained from the Kalman Filter. Figure 7.3(a) shows trajectories gen-
erated by level 0 samples, no conflicting samples have been encountered.
The simulation proceeds to level 1 where conditional samples are gen-
erated using Nc samples from level 0 as seeds. The trajectories of the
level 0 samples used as seeds are highlighted in Figure 7.3(a). The MH
method is applied to generate conditional samples from the seeds. The
trajectories of generated samples for level 1 are shown in Figure 7.3(b).
This process is continued to generates more trajectories as the number
of levels increase. The method continues until conflicting samples are
encountered at higher levels as shown in Figure 7.4. . . . . . . . . . . . 106
vii
7.4 The above figures show trajectories of conditional samples generated as
the simulation continues to higher levels. Subset Simulation continues
until the number of conflicting samples D found in a level is greater than
Nc within a level as shown in Figure 7.4(b). The probability of conflict
is estimated as Pc(K + 1) = 0.52× 10−4 as shown in Figure 7.4(d). . . . 107
7.5 The estimated Pc using the Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo
methods during the Head-on pass as shown in Figure 7.1a with varying
lateral separation La = {0, 100, 152, 500, 1000, 1100}m. . . . . . . . . . 110
7.6 SS and DMC trajectories for Head-on pass with lateral separation 1000m 111
7.7 The Pc is estimated using the SS and DMC methods during the Intruder
Overtaking the Observer scenario as shown in Figure 7.1(b) with varying
lateral separation La = {0, 100, 152, 500, 1000, 1100}m. . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.8 Head-on pass scenario with 1000m lateral separation and 20km longitu-
dinal separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.9 A comparison of accuracy and eﬃciency between DMC and SS methods
for estimating the Pc during the Head-on pass scenario. . . . . . . . . . 116
viii
List of Tables
2.1 The diﬀerent classes of airspace and restrictions [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Navion aerodynamic coeﬃcients [7] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1 Simulated Sensor Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 Parallel GPB-1 fault detection hypothesis for n sensors . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3 Filter comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.1 A table of samples, response values and probability intervals generated
at various levels during Subset Simulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2 The probabilities and response values of samples generated at various
levels of subset simulation are concatenated. Note that the seeds used
generate samples at each level are discarded and replaced with there
respective conditional samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.3 Samples generated during both levels of Subset Simulation. . . . . . . . 96
ix
Acronyms
UAS Unmanned Air Systems
UA Unmanned Aircraft
SAA Sense-And-Avoid
FDD Fault Detection and Diagnosis
FDI Fault Detection and Isolation
SWAP-C Size Weight and Power - Cost
SixDoF Six-Degrees-of-Freedom
GPB-1 Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1
NOTAM NOtice To AirMen
CAP Civil Aviation Publication
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
UK United Kingdom
FAA Federal Aviation Authority
USA United States of America
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
ATSU Air Traﬃc Service Unit
x
AFIS Air Flight Information Service
AoA Angle-of-Attack
SVFR Special Visual Flight Rules
ELOS Equivalent Level of Safety
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
TCAS Traﬃc Collision Avoidance System
GPS Global Positioning System
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
COTS Commercial of-the-shelf
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
PS Pitot-static
ISA International Standards Atmosphere
KF Kalman Filter
EKF Extended Kalman Filter
UT Unscented Transform
UKF Unscented Kalman Filter
IMM Interacting Multiple Model
MMAE Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation
MH Metropolis-Hastings
DMC Direct Monte Carlo
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo
SS Subset Simulation
CCDF Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
SMC Sequential Monte Carlo
xi
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Jason Ralph and Prof. Simon Maskell for
their guidance, advice and support throughout the duration of my PhD study. I would
like to thank Prof. Siu-Kui Au for his suggestions and insights during the research. I
would like to thank Flávio DeMelo and Matteo Fasiolo for their discussions that has
helped me understand some of the fundamental concepts which allowed me to progress
in methods discussed in this thesis. Special thanks to the post-doctoral researchers, Dr.
Elias Griﬃths and Dr. Austin Brockmeier for their help with MATLAB programming
during the early stages of my PhD study. I would like to thank my viva examiners,
Prof. Apostol Vourdas and Dr. Jeyarajan Thiyagalingam for there comments and
suggestions that were very helpful in submitting this thesis.
I would like to thank my friends Sebastian Karam and Aaron Dickenson for their
continuous encouragement throughout my PhD study. I would like to thank the Engi-
neering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) for funding the PhD which
has made this thesis possible.
Last but by no means least, I would like to thank my family for their constant
support and encouragement over the years.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) is restricted to segregated airspace
unless an equivalent level of safety to manned aviation can be demonstrated [8]. Segre-
gated airspace are blocks of airspace that are designated for UAS to operate within [9].
The restriction of UAS to operate within segregated airspace limits potential applica-
tions of UAS. Over the last decade numerous Aviation Authorities from around the
world have expressed an interest in integrating UAS operations into non-segregated
airspace [10]. However, issues related to safety, security and regulations prevent this
from occurring [11,12]. Regulatory bodies have expressed that the safety standards of
UAS should be no less demanding than current standards that are applied to manned
aircraft. An approach is to satisfy ‘equivalence’ to existing safety standards that ap-
ply to manned aviation. However, conducting manned aviation consists of interacting
with various entities, for example, operating in diﬀerent classes of airspace and com-
municating with air traﬃc controllers. At the same time, the operation of UAS should
be transparent to other airspace users and Air traﬃc controllers. To clarify, the UAS
operation should not impose any extra service requirements than ones already imposed
in manned aviation [8].
The restriction of UAS to operate within segregated airspace has motivated research
into and the development of automated safety systems to ensure that UAS can operate
in non-segregated airspace safely. Such systems are reliant on algorithms that are
computationally demanding to ensure that adequate levels of safety are achieved. This
computational demand requires fast hardware that is more expensive and leads to an
increase in size, weight and cost of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
Collision Avoidance has been identified as the most important issue that needs to
be addressed since it concerns the safety of the aircraft and other airspace users [11,13].
This is to prevent collision between aircraft and ensure survivability of the platform.
The ability to ensure that collisions between the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) and other
airspace users are avoided, is an essential safety requirement. Although the lack of a
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pilot or flight crew on-board the aircraft means that the aircraft is somewhat expend-
able, collision with other airspace users is unacceptable. In the event of a collision,
the secondary eﬀect of falling debris might also lead to ground casualties or (worse)
fatalities [14]. Therefore, a collision must be avoided at all cost. Perhaps, the quality
for any Unmanned Aircraft is to demonstrate the ability to follow the Rules of the Air
mandated by the Aviation Authority. To be specific, all airspace users are expected
to follow the ‘Right of Way’ rules. More importantly, safe separation between aircraft
must be maintained even if the Right of Way rules are not strictly followed. The lack of
a pilot on-board the aircraft creates the requirement for a ‘Sense-And-Avoid’ capability.
The Sense-And-Avoid (SAA) capability of the UAS consists of two functions - Conflict
Detection (CD) and Resolution (R). The conflict detection stage involves determin-
ing if a conflict exists using data obtained from sensors. This requires calculating the
probability of conflict from the probability distribution of the state of traﬃc inferred
from sensor data. Often the magnitude of this probability is very low and requires
significant computational load for this to be estimated. Despite the low magnitude of
the probability, it is important that it is estimated accurately since the resolution stage
is reliant on this and given the catastrophic outcome of a possible collision – the ability
to estimate the probability is essential, as it aﬀects the safe operations of the UAS.
Before capabilities, such as Sense-And-Avoid can be considered, an essential pre-
requisite for any aircraft (manned or unmanned) is the ability to maintain accurate
information defining the current heading, speed and attitude of the aircraft. This is
an estimate of the aircraft’s state and is inferred from the measurements obtained
from sensors on-board the aircraft. Maintaining accurate state information is essential
since the aircraft’s capabilities such as Navigation, Manoeuvring and Sense-And-Avoid
are reliant on this information. False sensor data obtained from faulty sensors can
lead to inaccurate state information that causes incorrect actions to be executed by
the aircraft and result in a failure to accomplish the mission, or worse - loss of the
aircraft and fatalities. For manned aircraft, operating in good visibility under Visual
Flight Rules, the problem of faulty sensors might be a mere inconvenience. In such
an event, the pilot could land the aircraft at the nearest airfield by looking out of the
window. However, in the case of Unmanned Aircraft, the lack of a pilot or flight crew
on-board the aircraft means that the operator is reliant on state-estimates deduced
from data obtained from sensors. Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) methods are
essential to detect faulty data obtained from faulty sensors to preserve the accuracy
of the state-estimate. Such methods involve processing data obtained from multiple
sensors to determine whether they are faulty or normal. Processing data from multiple
sensors increases the computational load associated with maintaining accurate state
information in a time-sensitive situation.
This thesis seeks to reduce the computational overheads associated with automated
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safety systems such as Sense and Avoid and Fault Detection systems by providing
eﬃcient algorithms which will lead to reductions in Size, Weight, and Power – and
reduced Cost (SWAP-C) of Unmanned Aircraft Systems [15].
1.1 Thesis Structure
The thesis examines the problem of large computational requirements by developing
eﬃcient algorithms that address the collision avoidance and multiple sensor fault detec-
tion problems. Chapter 2 familiarises the reader with background information related
to this area of research and describes the associated problems. Chapter 3 and 4 de-
velop a Six-Degrees-of-Freedom (SixDoF) flight model for an aircraft that represents a
generic Unmanned Aircraft. This is used as a test-bed to generate sensor data during
common flight modes. Chapter 5 introduces simulations for multiple sensor faults that
could occur on-board an aircraft or UAS. An eﬃcient sensor fault detection method
is demonstrated during common flight scenarios. Chapter 6 and 7 explore rare-event
simulation with applications to collision avoidance. Chapter 6 describes the theory of
Subset Simulation. Chapter 7 applies Subset Simulation to estimate the probability of
conflict for conflicting and potentially conflicting scenarios based on the Right of Way
Rules (defined in Annex 2 - Rules of the Air issued by the International Civil Aviation
Organization [16]). Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and suggests possible future work.
1.2 Novel Contributions of the Thesis
• The development of an autopilot for a Six-Degrees-of-Freedom (SixDoF) flight
model that can be used as a test-bed during common flight scenarios.
• The development of sensor simulation models on-board the aircraft to provide
observations for deducing the state of the aircraft. For example, sensor data
from Pitot-static, Angle-of-Attack and Inertial Measurement Unit sensors during
faulty and normal sensor operation are generated.
• A new Multiple Sensor Fault detection method using Generalized Pseudo Bayes
- 1 (GPB-1) is developed. This method detects faulty sensors by evaluating
the hypotheses for each sensor sequentially, which results in a faster and more
accurate update method than evaluating the hypotheses in parallel.
• The accuracy and computational load required for estimating low probabilities of
conflict between air traﬃc in non-cooperative scenarios is improved by the appli-
cation of Subset Simulation. Estimating low probabilities of conflict accurately
using Direct Monte Carlo method requires a large number of samples that gener-
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ates large computational load. The Subset Simulation method uses a fraction of
the samples required by Direct Monte Carlo to achieve the same level of accuracy.
• A benchmarking method based on the Right of Way rules is defined that can be
used for future comparison of eﬃciency and accuracy in estimating the probability
of conflict between air traﬃc.
1.3 Publications
• Doing the Right Thing: Collision Avoidance for Autonomous Air Vehicles, C.
Mishra, M. Mehta, E. J. Griﬃth and J. F. Ralph, 2013 IEEE International Con-
ference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Manchester 2013
• Eﬃcient Estimation of probability of conflict between air traﬃc using Subset Sim-
ulation, Chinmaya Mishra, Simon Maskell, Siu-Kui Au, Jason F.Ralph. Submit-
ted to IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems.
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1604.07363.pdf
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Chapter 2
Background
Currently, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are restricted to operate within segre-
gated airspace unless an adequate level of safety is satisfied. Segregated airspace are
temporary blocks of airspace that UAS operate within [8]. This is to protect other
aircraft that might be operating within the vicinity from hazards, such as the risk
of collision with the UAS. However, restricting UAS operations to segregated airspace
limits users in benefiting from the potential applications of UAS such as assisting emer-
gency services, establishing communication between remote locations and monitoring
environmental changes [17,18]. It also inconveniences existing manned flight operations.
For example, manned flights must modify there usual flight plans and navigate around
to ensure that segregated airspace is not breached. These alterations increase the ex-
penditure of flight operations [12]. Manned flights are notified of the regions where and
when UAS operations are occurring by NOTAMs (NOtice To AirMen) that are issued
by the Aviation Authority governing the country’s airspace [19]. Within the United
Kingdom, UAS operate under the provision of Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722
issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) [8]. The Air Navigation Order issued by
the CAA is followed by manned aviation and takes precedence over any operation [20].
This chapter outlines the issues arising from increased computational load gener-
ated by satisfying safety related requirements such as collision avoidance and sensor
fault detection for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This chapter begins by familiarising
the reader with the existing Rules and Regulations followed by manned aviation in
section 2.1. The problem of satisfying UAS safety ‘equivalence’ to existing manned
aviation is discussed in section 2.2. Collision Avoidance and Sensor Fault detection
are essential safety requirements for UAS and are discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4
respectively.
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2.1 Rules and Regulations
The Rules and Regulations for civilian flight date back to the 1920s that began with
a series of conventions such as the 1919 Paris Convention [21, 22], the 1926 Iibero-
American Convention [23] and the 1926 Havana Convention [24]. The most significant
convention is the 1944 Chicago Convention which had 52 signatory states [25]. The con-
vention established the foundation for aviation safety, procedures, rules and regulation
with International cooperation that is currently enforced. Since then, the number of
signatory states has grown to 191 and is now known as the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) [25]. The Rules and Regulations issued by each state’s Aviation
Authority, such as the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the United Kingdom (UK)
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States (US), are based on
the Rules and Regulations published by the ICAO, which consist of 18 Annexes [26,27].
This section sets out some of the relevant Rules and Regulations that govern General
Aviation.
2.1.1 Flight Rules
According to Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation - Rules of the
Air, a flight is conducted under one of three diﬀerent flight rules [6, 16]. These are:
• Visual Flight Rules (VFR): flights conducted under VFR are reliant on the flight
crew’s ability to perform tasks such as navigation; and maintain safe separation
between traﬃc and terrain by visual reference. Therefore, VFR flight can only
be conducted when the Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) minima are met
and the weather conditions are suitable for the flight crew to maintain suﬃcient
situational awareness while relying on visual cues only. The VMC minima vary
depending on the flight level of the aircraft. For example, while flying at or above
3050m Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL), visibility of 8km must be maintained,
below this but above 900m (AMSL) or 300m which ever is higher, flight visibility
of 3km needs to be maintained [16].
• Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): flights are conducted when the weather conditions
are below the VMC minima – otherwise known as Instrument Meteorological Con-
ditions (IMC) and a VFR flight cannot be conducted. Such weather conditions
are known as Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and the pilot or flight
crew are reliant on instruments to navigate – a combination of Collision Avoid-
ance systems and advisories from Air traﬃc Service Units (ATSU) are used to
maintain safe separation [16].
• Special Visual Flight Rules (SVFR): is a provision for VFR flight that needs
to access restricted airspace where VFR is prohibited. This is useful for specific
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scenarios; for example, when an aircraft is operating under VFR and needs access
to an airfield that requires transiting through restricted airspace [16].
2.1.2 Right of Way
The Right of Way rules stated in Annex 2 are followed by traﬃc to resolve conflict(s)
that might be encountered between aircraft during flight. A conflict exists in a scenario
where a collision or loss of minimum separation between aircraft is imminent and no
action is taken. The element(s) of traﬃc that are involved in the conflict need to execute
manoeuvres to ensure the conflict is resolved. The type of manoeuvre and the element
of traﬃc that needs to execute it, depends on the geometry of the encounter. The
geometry of three diﬀerent types of conflicts are shown in Figure 2.1 and are defined
as:
• Head-on: A Head-on conflict exists when an aircraft is approaching another
aircraft on a Head-on (or approximately Head-on) collision course. In such a
case, each aircraft must alter course to the right to avoid collision as shown in
Figure 2.1(a).
• Overtaking: An Overtaking conflict occurs when an aircraft is approaching an-
other aircraft from behind as shown in Figure 2.1(b). To be specific, an overtaking
condition exists when the overtaking aircraft is approaching the rear of the aircraft
to be overtaken within an angle less than 70 degrees from the extended centreline.
In such a scenario, the aircraft being overtaken has the Right of Way and should
maintain speed and heading as shown in Figure 2.1(b). The overtaking aircraft
must alter course right and keep clear of the aircraft to be overtaken.
• Converging: A converging conflict occurs when two aircraft are converging and
a conflict is imminent as shown in Figure 2.1(c) – the aircraft on the right has
the right of way and should maintain speed and heading as shown in the figure.
The aircraft on the left must alter its course right to resolve the collision.
Annex 2 also states that regardless of the Right of Way rules above, it is essen-
tial that a collision is avoided. The Pilot-in-Command of the respective aircraft is
responsible to ensure that a collision does not occur.
A minimum threshold has not been defined explicitly by the ICAO [28–30]. How-
ever, Aviation Authorities and Regulatory Bodies implicitly understand that a mini-
mum threshold of 500 ft must be maintained in all directions. For example the ‘Low
Flying Rule’ issued by the CAA states that no aircraft should be flown closer than 500
ft to any person, vessel, vehicle or structure except with written permission from the
CAA [20]. The FAA defines a separation of 500 ft as ‘well clear’ [31].
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Figure 2.1: These figures illustrate the geometric configuration of the diﬀerent conflicts that
might be encountered within a block of airspace. This includes diﬀerent manoeuvres required to
be executed by the respective parties to resolve the conflict.
2.1.3 Air Traﬃc Service Unit
Air Traﬃc Service Units (ATSU) are ground based Units that monitor and communicate
with flights with the primary goal of ensuring safe operations. There are diﬀerent types
of Air Traﬃc Control, each type has diﬀerent callsigns and responsibilities [6]:
• Air Traﬃc Control Unit types: Tower, Radar, Approach, Ground, Director, Con-
trol - These units can be only operated by licensed air traﬃc controllers. The call
sign describes the area of responsibility. These types of units are authorised to
issue instructions or advise pilots.
• Aerodrome Flight Information Service (AFIS): Information - This unit provides
flight information service regarding traﬃc in the vicinity.
• Aerodrome Air/Ground Communication Service: Radio - This type of unit assists
pilots by providing information only.
2.1.4 Airspace
The airspace is divided into regions and further subdivided into classes. Annex 11
to the convention on International Civil Aviation – Air Traﬃc Services defines the
diﬀerent classes of airspace designated A to G in order of most restrictive to least
restrictive, where airspaces A to E are controlled airspace and F to G are uncontrolled
airspace [32]. The restrictions and limitations of the diﬀerent classes of airspace are
defined in Table 2.1.
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Airspace
Class
Clearance IFR/VFR Separation Traﬃc In-
formation
A required IFR and
SVFR only
between all air-
craft
For all air-
craft
B required IFR/VFR between all air-
craft
For all air-
craft
C required IFR/VFR IFR/IFR and
IFR/VFR
VFR/VFR
D required IFR/VFR IFR/IFR IFR - VFR
E required for
IFR only
IFR/IFR IFR - IFR/SVFR All aircraft
if possible
F not required IFR/VFR not provided Available for
all aircraft if
possible
G not required IFR/VFR not provided Available for
all aircraft if
possible
Table 2.1: The diﬀerent classes of airspace and restrictions [6]
It is apparent from Table 2.1 that the diﬀerent restrictions, limitations and services
a flight is subject to, vary according to the class of airspace it is operating within and
the flight rules that it operates under. In order for a UAS to be allowed to operate
within controlled airspace alongside its manned equivalent, it must satisfy the same
safety standards as its manned equivalent. However, applying a single standard of
safety to all Unmanned Aircraft is not practical and might be unnecessary [33]. For
example, an Unmanned Aircraft used for communications – operating above a densely
populated city must satisfy a higher level of safety than an Unmanned Aircraft used for
surveying caves in a remote location [11]. There are diﬀerent types of UAS with varying
levels of autonomy, depending on the type of mission, some are more suited than others.
A mission might require access to controlled airspace that has a higher level of safety
than uncontrolled airspace [34]. Additionally, accessing controlled airspace requires
communicating with ATSU. For manned flight, it is the flight crew’s responsibility
to ensure communication with the appropriate ATSU. However, the absence of a flight
crew for an Unmanned Aircraft means it is the remote operator’s responsibility to ensure
communications during the mission [8]. A sensible approach to satisfy the safety level
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of a UAS is to follow a ‘Concept of Operation’ (CONops) on a ‘mission-by-mission’
basis where safety analysis can be conducted that considers factors such as the type of
aircraft, the class of airspace that needs to be accessed to accomplish the mission, and
the responsibilities of the operator [13,35,36].
2.2 Equivalent Level of Safety
The operation of UAS flights needs to be treated with the same level of importance as
current manned flight [28]. The Aviation Authorities state that interaction with a UAS
should be no less demanding than its manned equivalent. A proposed method is to
derive an ‘Equivalent Level Of Safety’ (ELOS) to existing manned standards [10] [28].
Dalamagidkis et al. approach the problem of deriving system requirements to be able
to meet the ELOS for Unmanned Aircraft Systems by proposing safety risk models [10].
A safety risk model is used for estimating fatalities that could occur due to accidents
involving Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This is approached by evaluating the current
level of safety of manned aviation using statistics of fatalities that have occurred due
to manned air accidents between 1983 and 2006, obtained from the National Transport
Safety Board (NTSB) [12,37]. A risk model for estimating the fatalities after accidents
due Ground Impact and mid-air Collisions are derived based on fatalities that have
occurred in the past due to manned aviation [38]. The model considers factors such as
the population density of area aﬀected by the accident, the size, mass, orientation of
the aircraft and kinetic energy dissipated on impact is also considered. In some cases,
the estimated fatality rate is mentioned as over conservative for UAS since it is derived
using statistics of casualties and fatalities of mid-air collision between manned aircraft.
Zeitlin and Larcher have expressed the problem of demonstrating ELOS for UAS
Collision Avoidance [13]. The problem exists in establishing a baseline performance
of Collision Avoidance for manned flight that is required to demonstrate ELOS. The
performance is dependent on the pilot or flight crew’s ability to visually acquire the
hazard (traﬃc or obstacle) and react in time to resolve the conflict by selecting the
appropriate manoeuvre. Although it is possible to estimate the human ability to vi-
sually acquire hazards such as traﬃc – estimating other factors such as reaction time,
the ability to select the appropriate resolution manoeuvre and the ability to adapt to
the changing situation is diﬃcult [13]. Furthermore, the collision risk in manned avi-
ation varies depending on the class of airspace it is operating within. For example,
operating in controlled airspace has low risk of collision than operating in uncontrolled
airspace [13].
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2.3 Sense and Avoid
Collision Avoidance has been identified as a critical requirement to enable the inte-
gration of UAS operations in non-segregated airspace [13, 39]. Aviation in controlled
airspace involves following a combination of procedures and communicating with Air
Traﬃc Control as outlined by respective Aviation Authorities to ensure safety [40]. For
manned aviation, it is the pilot’s responsibility to maintain safe separation and avoid
collision with traﬃc [16]. The same applies in the case of Unmanned Aircraft – it is the
responsibility of the remote operator to maintain situational awareness of the aircraft
and the vicinity it is operating within to avoid any collision [41]. The lack of pilot or
flight crew on-board the Unmanned Aircraft requires the operator to rely on sensors
to be aware of its own aircraft and the immediate environment, which could contain
hazards such as birds, terrain, traﬃc and other obstacles. For such capability the term
‘Sense-And-Avoid’ (SAA) is more appropriate than ‘See-And-Avoid’. The SAA capabil-
ity for UAS is composed of two main functions [33]. Firstly, ‘Separation Assurance’ –
this is a pre-emptive measure to reduce probability of collision by following procedures
such as maintaining minimum separation as instructed by ATSU. Usually, at this stage
the aircraft will make small corrections to its course that result in gentle manoeuvres
to ensure that the required separation minima are maintained and the aircraft remains
‘well clear’ of traﬃc and hazards [20]. Secondly, ‘Collision Avoidance’ – this is the last
level of protection where aggressive manoeuvres might be required to ensure that a col-
lision is prevented. The Collision Avoidance stage consists of two functions – Conflict
Detection (CD) and Resolution (R). The Conflict Detection phase consists of detect-
ing traﬃc, terrain or obstacles. In the case of detected traﬃc, it needs to be tracked
accurately. This means determining that the detection is valid according to current
state-space (position and trajectory). The projected trajectory of the tracked object
must be evaluated to determine if it conflicts with the Unmanned Aircraft [33]. If a
conflict exists, the Resolution (R) stage involves executing the appropriate manoeuvre
to resolve the conflict. The appropriate manoeuvre is one that the Unmanned Aircraft
is capable of executing and is compliant with the Right of Way Rules according to the
geometry of the encounter. More importantly, the resolution manoeuvre must prevent
a collision [33].
Initial work on CD&R in the early 1980’s can be found in robotics where the collision
avoidance problem has been treated as a path planning task [42] and an early approach
to the problem involved using artificial potential fields [43]. Such methods are suitable
for scenarios where movement of the vehicles may be relatively slow, restricted in space
or in scope. However, over the following decades, the increased use of UAS has created
demand for autonomous CD&R solutions which are more suitable for the dynamic
aerospace environment. A large number of CD&R methods have been proposed during
this period and comprehensive surveys have been conducted by Kuchar and Yang [44],
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Krozel et al. [45], Warren [46] and Zeghal [47]. Kuchar and Yang have proposed a
taxonomy of methods useful in identifying gaps and directing future eﬀorts within the
SAA community [44]. More recently, Albaker and Rahim have presented an up to date
survey of CD&R methods for UAS [48]. The CD&R methods can be categorised into
two main groups known as Cooperative and Non-Cooperative CD&R. The following
sub-sections give a brief overview of Cooperative and Non-cooperative CD&R.
2.3.1 Cooperative CD&R
Cooperative CD&R methods require coordination between traﬃc to resolve the con-
flict. For example, following the Right of Way rules is a form of cooperative resolution.
In order to ensure successful conflict resolution, the resolution manoeuvre needs to be
coordinated with the conflicting traﬃc. This requires sharing information such as the
current altitude, speed and heading of the aircraft by communication via radio or by
using cooperative equipment such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
(ADS-B), Transponders and Traﬃc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). This infor-
mation is known as the state of the aircraft. The intended altitude, speed and heading
is also shared with traﬃc. The traﬃc is expected to share similar information to ensure
coordination.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
This is a cooperative surveillance technology that consists of equipment on-board an
aircraft that broadcasts the current state of its own aircraft (position, velocity and
heading). The state information is obtained from a Navigation system on-board the
aircraft, such as GPS [49].
Transponders
Some aircraft carry transponders that respond to interrogation from ground based units
such as ATSU and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). Airborne equipment is reliant
on transponders carried by traﬃc to be aware of the traﬃc operating in the vicinity
and resolve potential conflicts. An example of airborne equipment is Traﬃc Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS).
Traﬃc Collision Avoidance System
Traﬃc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is a Collision Avoidance system that was
first deployed on-board commercial aircraft in the US during the 1990s [50–52]. Cur-
rently, the system is mandated by the ICAO to be carried by all aircraft that exceed a
maximum take-oﬀ weight of 5700 kg or carrying more than 19 passengers. The TCAS
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system issues Traﬃc Advisories (TA) when traﬃc is detected and is projected to breach
the aircraft’s protected zone. Resolution Advisories (RA) are issued to the pilot or flight
crew by TCAS to resolve the conflicts.
The TCAS solution is infeasible for UAS for number of reasons:
• TCAS operates under the assumption that traﬃc encountered is capable of achiev-
ing climb rates of 1500 ft/min to 2500 ft/min. However, not all Unmanned Air-
craft platforms can achieve this sort of performance [53].
• TCAS is reliant on all aircraft carrying transponders to be detected. Not all
traﬃc are equipped with transponders.
In a situation where a manned flight operating in uncontrolled airspace (F and G) in
VFR without traﬃc alerting service and without TCAS, is reliant on the pilot looking
out of the window to See-And-Avoid any hazards or possible conflicts. In the case of an
Unmanned Aircraft, the lack of pilot or flight crew means that the operator is reliant
on sensors on-board the aircraft to satisfy the See-And-Avoid requirement. For such
cases, non-cooperative methods need to be used to satisfy CD&R.
2.3.2 Non-Cooperative CD&R
Non-Cooperative CD&R assumes that no information related to the current state or
future intent has been shared between aircraft (i.e. there is no flight plan exchange or
radio/data link). This is a far more challenging problem since information related to
traﬃc state and intentions must be measured or inferred from the behaviour of non-
cooperative aircraft. Normally, this will be due to the lack of appropriate technology
on-board the aircraft: for example, a lightweight commercial of-the-shelf (COTS) UAS,
obtained by the general public and used for recreational purposes. Problems occur
when these aircraft are operated within non-segregated airspace. This type of airspace
contains aircraft (manned or unmanned) that adhere to the Rules of the Air and expect
traﬃc to do so as well. The lack of cooperative technology on-board a lightweight UAS
prevents awareness of traﬃc and increases the risk of a mid-air collision. This problem
needs to be addressed due to the increased number of near miss incidents involving
such UAS operating within non-segregated airspace [54]. The problem of the lack
of information is addressed by using on-board sensors. Information related to state of
traﬃc is obtained from observations using sensors such as Radar, Lidar and/or cameras.
For example, Mcfadyen et al. have considered using visual predictive control with a
spherical camera model to create a collision avoidance controller [55]. Recently, Huh
et al. have proposed a vision based Sense-and-Avoid framework that utilizes a camera
to detect and avoid approaching airborne intruders [56]. A collision avoidance system
that uses a combination of Radar and electro-optical sensors have been prototyped and
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tested by Accardo et al [57]. Measurement data obtained from sensors are inherently
noisy. This gives rise to uncertainties in the observed state and predicted motion of the
non-cooperative aircraft. In an environment where future trajectories are uncertain,
the likelihood of a conflict is an essential metric. Obtaining an accurate estimate for
the Probability of Conflict (Pc), given the sensor data, is a key parameter required to
resolve traﬃc conflicts.
Probabilistic methods for conflict resolution that require the calculation of metrics
like the probability of conflict (Pc) have been discussed in [44]. Nordlund and Gustafs-
son [58] noted the huge number of simulations required to get suﬃcient reliability for
small risks, and suggested an approach that reduced the three dimensional problem to
a one dimensional integral along piecewise straight paths [59,60]. More recently, Jilkov
et al. have extended a method developed by Blom and Bakker [61] and estimated
Pc using multiple models for aircraft trajectory prediction [62]. Many probabilistic
CD&R methods use Monte Carlo methods where uncertainties exist [52,62–68]. Unfor-
tunately, for scenarios where the expected Pc is low, a Monte Carlo method will require
a very large number of samples to estimate Pc with any accuracy. The large number
of samples generate an increased computational load. Despite the low probability, the
catastrophic outcome of a collision makes it essential to estimate the probability of
conflict accurately. The computational demand requires the computation capacity to
be large, which results in increased size, weight and power requirements. This might
not be feasible due to limited resources and size, weight and power restrictions. Chap-
ters 6 and 7 focus on the problem of estimating low probability of conflict between Air
traﬃc eﬃciently and accurately.
2.4 Fault Detection
As mentioned previously, accurate awareness of the state of the aircraft is an important
requirement for safe operation of any aircraft. Systems on-board the aircraft that
handle crucial functions such as Collision Avoidance, Navigation and Flight Controls
are reliant on accurate state estimation. The state of the aircraft is estimated by fusing
data obtained from multiple sensors on-board the aircraft. The accuracy of the data is
dependent on the integrity of the sensors. If false data are obtained from faulty sensor
then the state-estimate is corrupted and that misleads the aircraft and the flight crew.
Fatalities due to faulty sensor readings have occurred in the recent past on com-
mercial flights such as the Air France (AF447) and XL Airways Germany Flight 888T
accidents. On the 1st of June 2009, Air France Flight AF447 departed from Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil and was en route to Paris, France. The aircraft crashed into the Atlantic
Ocean when it was unable to recover from an aerodynamic stall. The investigation of
the flight AF447 accident by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de lávia-
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tion civile (BEA) concluded that inconsistent airspeed and altitude readings due to the
suspected formation of ice crystals in the pitot tubes caused the autopilot to disconnect
and reconfigure to an alternate law [69]. This faulty data obtained from the sensors
contributed to misleading the flight crew and caused incorrect reactions [4]. This is
an example of an instance where false state awareness has misled the flight crew and
caused an accident. On 27th of November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T
departed from Perpignan-Rivesaltes Airport in France, on an acceptance flight test,
prior to the aircraft being handed back to Air New Zealand [70]. Two hours later, the
aircraft crashed into the Mediterranean sea. The final report by BEA concluded that
one of the factors contributing to the accident was improper maintenance procedures,
which caused water to enter the Angle-of-Attack (AoA) sensors [70]. The water froze
during the flight and caused the Angle-of-Attack sensor to output incorrect AoA data.
The accident occurred when the flight crew improvised a demonstration of the Angle-
of-Attack protections. However, the frozen AoA sensor made it impossible to trigger
the protection and this led to improper handling by the flight crew and resulted in a
crash.
A sensor fault detection capability is required for all aircraft to maintain state
awareness. This capability is essential in the case of Unmanned Aircraft, where there
is no pilot or flight crew on-board the aircraft. The operator is reliant on sensors to
determine the state of the aircraft. The typical output of a fault detection system is
a binary indication – either the sensor has failed or it is operating normally [71]. Nu-
merous fault detection methods have been proposed with various diﬀerent modelling
methods [72, 73]. The two main groups of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) meth-
ods can be categorised as Hardware Redundancy and Analytical Redundancy [72, 73].
Hardware Redundancy is where multiple sensors measure and compare the same type
of signal to deduce if a fault exists. The diﬀerence between the measurements is known
as a residual [74]. For sensors operating normally, the magnitude of the residual is very
small. The system is deigned so that a fault will generate a significant residual. A
residual above a defined threshold is detected as a fault. Hardware Redundancy is a
common approach for fault detection and is currently in practice within industry [73].
For instance, Boeing uses a voting scheme on its aircraft, where multiple measurements
obtained from the same type of sensor are compared and erroneous ones are omit-
ted [75]. This sort of voting scheme operates under the assumption that the majority
of signals that are similar represent the truth and any signal that is significantly diﬀer-
ent to the majority is the result of a failure and must be discarded [76]. However, this is
not a robust approach and catastrophic failures have occurred [75]. For example, in the
event that all sensors exhibit similar faults, the residual will still remain as zero despite
a fault having occurred – a false negative. Also, multiple sensors lead to an increase in
weight and cost, this might not be feasible due to payload restrictions [72,77]. For such
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cases, Analytical Redundancy is required where the residual is generated by comparing
the sensor measurement against the estimated sensor measurement obtained from a
mathematical model of the system [78]. The mathematical model is typically derived
from first principles, such as Newton’s Laws of motion for mechanical systems [72].
A popular approach to fault detection using analytical redundancy involves running
a bank of models, where the diﬀerent models match particular behaviour of the system.
In other words, each model is a hypothesis that represents the behaviour of the system
in normal or faulty mode. For example, a system with one sensor has a bank with 2
models – one representing the hypothesis that the sensor is operating normally and the
other representing the hypothesis that the sensor is faulty. The bank of models are
run in parallel and the estimated measurement generated from each model is compared
with the actual measurement obtained from the sensor to generate a residual [79].
This residual is used to determine the probability that the hypotheses are true. The
probability of the hypotheses is used to deduce the state of the system (normal or
faulty). This approach is an adaptation of Multiple Models, an approach that is popular
in the Target Tracking community [79].
A combination of both Hardware and Analytical redundancy methods needs to be
used for aircraft. This is because an aircraft requires many diﬀerent types of sensors,
because each type of sensor provides a diﬀerent measurement needed to deduce an ele-
ment of the state information for the aircraft. For example, the pressure measurements
obtained from a Pitot-static system are used to deduce the barometric altitude and
speed of the aircraft [80] – but this sensor cannot be used to deduce the orientation
of the aircraft. Instead, the rotational rate measurements obtained from the Inertial
Measurement System (IMU) are used to deduce the orientation of the aircraft. The
diﬀerent types of sensor commonly found on aircraft and the measurements they pro-
vide are discussed later in Chapter 4. Hardware redundancy is often required to meet
safety requirements outlined by Aviation Authority to ensure that the level of accept-
able probability of failure is met. For example, the safety analysis of the Electronic
Flight Instrument System (EFIS) conducted in [80], consists of a fault tree analysis of
the EFIS that shows a failure rate 10−12 per flight hour by including multiple hard-
ware redundancies for instruments. This meets the acceptable probability of failure
rate stated by the FAA of 10−9 per flight hour [81]. However, this increase in the
number of sensors leads to an increase in the hypotheses for normal and faulty sensors.
The increase in hypotheses results in an increased number of models that need to be
evaluated, which causes an increase in the computational load.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has familiarised the reader with some of the existing rules and regulations
followed by manned aircraft. Such rules and regulations are expected to be observed
by Unmanned Aircraft in order to share the same airspace as manned flight. Collision
Avoidance and Sensor Fault Detection capabilities are essential safety requirements
for the safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems alongside manned flight. Non-
cooperative Collision Avoidance requires calculating the probability of a conflict using
Monte Carlo methods. For scenarios where the probability of conflict is low, a large
number of samples are required to estimate the probability of conflict accurately. Sensor
Fault Detection is an essential requirement since core UAS functionalities are reliant on
sensor data. Multiple sensors on-board the aircraft result in high computational load
for sensor fault detection.
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Chapter 3
Navion Flight Model
A Six-Degrees-of-Freedom flight model for an aircraft is required to represent an Un-
manned Aircraft that can be used to generate flight data for testing collision avoidance
and fault detection algorithms. A flight model for a Navion aircraft defined in [7] is
suitable since it is a standard flight model and can be used to compare future algo-
rithms for benchmarking purposes. This flight model has been used in the past for
various research related applications such as estimating the state of the aircraft by
visual cues [82] and testing aircraft flight control systems [83].
The flight data generated by simulation allows the capabilities of the aircraft such
as turn rates and climb rates during common flight modes to be considered. The
most common flight modes that aircraft spend time operating within are in level flight,
climbing, descending and turning. A basic autopilot system will allow the operator to
specify a heading and altitude to be maintained.
This chapter presents a standard flight model for a Navion aircraft with an autopilot
that represents the Unmanned Aircraft to be studied in later chapters. A series of test
scenarios are simulated using the autopilot.
3.1 Axes Systems
Before a flight model is derived, the axes systems needs to be established to define the
state of the aircraft. The three types of right handed axes systems commonly used are
Earth-axes, Body-axes and Wind-axes [84].
• Earth-axes: Figure 3.1 shows the Earth-axes as the fixed frame of reference where
Oe is the origin of the axis, Xe points North and is orthogonal to Ye which points
East. The Ze axis points Down towards the centre of the earth and is aligned with
the gravity vector [85]. The Ze axis is orthogonal to the XeYe plane. The XeYe
horizontal plane is tangential to the surface of the earth, assuming a flat Earth
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non-rotating approximation [86]. This approximation is suitable for defining the
aircraft’s trajectory that is operating locally within distances of 20 km [85,87]. In
the case of vehicles operating over longer distances, more complex axes systems,
such as spherical Earth-Axes with the rotating Earth assumption, need to be
considered. For example, the trajectory of a long rage missile or the orbital path
of a satellite are cases where the curvature and rotation of the earth needs to be
considered [88]. However, the flat earth approximation is suitable for simulating
low speed aircraft, such as the Navion aircraft. All simulations considered within
this thesis assume non-rotating flat Earth-axes since the Navion aircraft typically
flies at 150 knots (77.2ms−1) and the period of the simulation does not exceed
120 seconds. This results in a maximum distance of approximately 9km, which
is suitable for non-rotating flat Earth-axes.
• Body-axes: The Forces and Moments experienced by the aircraft are calculated
in Body-axes. Figure 3.1 show the Body-axes fixed to the body of the aircraft
where the origin Ob is located at the aircraft’s centre of gravity, the Xb axis
extends forward along the aircraft centre line and is known as the longitudinal
axis. This is orthogonal to the Yb axis, which extends along the right wing and
is known as the lateral axis [88]. The Zb axis extends Down and is orthogonal to
the XbYb plane.
• Wind-axes: The aerodynamic forces and moments exerted on the aircraft are
defined in the Wind-axes. This system of axes is included to allow for motion
in a non-stationary air mass. The Wind-axes are oriented with respect to the
aircraft Body-axes. The Xw axis points in the direction of the aircraft true speed
Va. The Yw is orthogonal to the Xw axis. The Zw is orthogonal to the XwYw
plane.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the aircraft’s Body-axes system and the Earth-axes system. The
Body-axes are used to define the Forces and Moments experienced by the aircraft. The
origin of the aircraft axis system defines the orientation and position of the aircraft
with respect to the fixed earth co-ordinates.
3.2 Equations of Motion
The equations of motion for a Six-Degrees-of-Freedom (SixDoF) aircraft are derived
from Newton’s Second law of motion and stated as: The summation of all external
forces acting on a body is equal to the time rate of change of the momentum of the body;
and the summation of all external moments acting on the body is equal to the time rate
of change of the moment of momentum (angular momentum) [7]. The summation of
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Figure 3.1: The Earth-axes and aircraft Body-axes
forces F acting on a body with mass m due to the change in momentum is expressed
in vector form as
F = d
dt
(mV) (3.1)
where V is the velocity of the body with respect to the Body-axes. The force and
velocity are vector quantities and are expressed as F = [FXb , FYb , FZb ] and V = [u, v, w]
respectively in the Body-axes, where FXb , FYb , FZb and u, v, w are forces and speeds
acting along the Xb, Yb, Zb directions respectively. Consider an element of mass δm
that has a position vector r from the centre of mass in the aircraft and V is the
velocity of δm relative to the inertial frame of reference. Then, the force acting on the
element of mass is δF. This is expressed as
δF = δmdV
dt
(3.2)
The velocity of the element of mass is
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V = Vc +
dr
dt
= Vc + ω × r (3.3)
where Vc is the velocity of the centre of mass, drdt is the velocity of the element of mass
relative to the centre of mass and ω is the angular velocity about the centre of mass.
The position vector r and angular velocity ω are expressed as
r = xi+ yj+ zk (3.4)
ω = pi+ qj+ rk (3.5)
The summation of the forces acting on the total mass is total force experienced by
the body. This is expressed as
F =
∑
δF =
∑ d
dt
(
Vc +
dr
dt
)
δm (3.6)
F = d
dt
∑
Vcδm+
dr
dt
∑ d
dt
δm (3.7)
assuming the total mass remains constant the above can be rewritten as
F = dVc
dt
m+ d
2
dt2
∑
r δm (3.8)
Since r is measured from the centre of mass, the summation∑ r δm = 0. This simplifies
to
F = dVc
dt
m (3.9)
The derivative of an arbitrary vector A referred to a rotating body frame having
an angular velocity ω can be represented by the following vector identity [7]:
dA
dt
∣∣∣∣
I
= dA
dt
∣∣∣∣
B
+ ω ×A (3.10)
This identity is applied to equation (3.1)
F = m
(
dVc
dt
∣∣∣∣
B
+ ω ×Vc
)
(3.11)
where ω ×Vc is given by
ω ×Vc =
i j k
p q r
u v w
= i(qw − rv) + j(ru− pw) + k(pv − qu) (3.12)
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F = m
[
i(u˙+ qw − rv) + j(v˙ + ru− pw) + k(w˙ + pv − qu)
]
(3.13)
The equations for the individual components are
Fxb = m(u˙+ qw − rv) (3.14)
Fyb = m(v˙ + ru− pw) (3.15)
Fzb = m(w˙ + pv − qu) (3.16)
Similarly, the total moment of the body M is the time rate of change of the moment
of momentum H. This is expressed as
M = d
dt
H (3.17)
where M is the total moment of the body and H is the moment of momentum. Both
are vector quantities and are expressed in the Body-axes; M = [L,M,N ]T where L is
the rolling moment about the Xb axis, M is the pitching moment about the Yb axis and
N is the yaw moment about the Zb axis in the Body-axes. The moment of momentum
H = [HX ,HY ,HZ ]T where HX ,HY ,HZ are components of H about the Xb, Yb, Zb axis
respectively.
The equations for the individual components are
L = d
dt
HX (3.18)
M = d
dt
HY (3.19)
N = d
dt
HZ (3.20)
The moment δM of an element of mass δm is expressed as
δM = d
dt
δH = d
dt
(r×V)δm (3.21)
The velocity of the mass element can be expressed in terms of the velocity of the centre
of mass and the relative velocity of the mass element to the centre of mass
V = Vc + ω × r (3.22)
where ω is the angular velocity of the vehicle and r is the position of the element of the
mass relative to the centre of mass. The total moment of momentum can be written as
H =
∑
δH =
∑
(r×Vc)δm+
∑
[r× (ω × r)]δm (3.23)
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The velocity is constant with respect to the summation and can be taken outside
H = Vc
∑
rδm+
∑
[r× (ω × r)]δm (3.24)
Since ∑ rδm = 0 the expression simplifies to
H =
∑
[r× (ω × r)]δm (3.25)
ω × r =
i j k
p q r
x y z
= i(qz − ry) + j(rx− pz) + k(py − qx) (3.26)
r× (ω × r) =
i j k
x y z
(qz − ry) (rx− pz) (py − qx)
(3.27)
= i[y(py − qx)− z(rx− pz)] (3.28)
+ j[z(qz − ry)− x(py − qx)] (3.29)
+ k[x(rx− pz)− y(qz − ry)] (3.30)
H =
∑
i[y(py−qx)−z(rx−pz)]+j[z(qz−ry)−x(py−qx)]+k[x(rx−pz)−y(qz−ry)]δm
(3.31)
The equations for the individual components expressed in the Body-axes are
Hx =
∑
[y(py − qx)− z(rx− pz)]δm (3.32)
=
∑
(py2 − qxy − zrx+ pz2)δm
=
∑
[p(y2 + z2)− xyq − xzr]δm
Hy =
∑
[z(qz − ry)− x(py − qx)]δm (3.33)
=
∑
[qz2 − ryz − pyx+ qx2)]δm
=
∑
[q(x2 + z2)− yzr − yxp]δm
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Hz =
∑
[x(rx− pz)− y(qz − ry)]δm (3.34)
=
∑
[rx2 − pzx− yqz + ry2]δm
=
∑
[r(x2 + y2)− zxp− zyq]δm
The summations in the above equations are the mass moments and products of inertia
of the aeroplane that are defined by the following expressions [7].
Ix =
∫ ∫ ∫
(y2 + z2) δm (3.35)
Iy =
∫ ∫ ∫
(x2 + z2) δm (3.36)
Iz =
∫ ∫ ∫
(x2 + y2) δm (3.37)
Ixy =
∫ ∫ ∫
xy δm (3.38)
Ixz =
∫ ∫ ∫
xz δm (3.39)
Iyz =
∫ ∫ ∫
yz δm (3.40)
The expressions are applied to equations (3.33), (3.34) and (3.35).
Hx = p
∑
(y2 + z2) δm− q
∑
xy δm− r
∑
xz δm = pIx − qIxy − rIxz (3.41)
Hy = q
∑
(x2 + z2) δm− r
∑
yz δm− p
∑
xy δm = qIy − rIyz − pIxy (3.42)
Hz = r
∑
(x2 + y2) δm− p
∑
xz δm− q
∑
yz δm = rIz − pIxz − qIyz (3.43)
Expression (3.10) is applied to equation (3.21) the angular moments
M = dH
dt
∣∣∣∣
B
+ ω ×H (3.44)

L
M
N
 = ddt

Hx
Hy
Hz
+ ω ×H =

H˙x
H˙y
H˙z
+
i j k
p q r
Hx Hy Hz
(3.45)
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where ω ×H is given by
ω ×H =
i j k
p q r
Hx Hy Hz
= iqHz − rHy
+ jrHx − pHz
+ kpHy − qHx

L
M
N
 =

H˙x
H˙y
H˙z
+

qHz − rHy
rHx − pHz
pHy − qHx
 (3.46)

L
M
N
 =

p˙Ix − q˙Ixy − r˙Ixz
q˙Iy − r˙Iyz − p˙Ixy
r˙Iz − p˙Ixz − q˙Iyz
+

q(rIz − pIxz − qIyz)− r(qIy − rIyz − pIxy)
r(pIx − qIxy − rIxz)− p(rIz − pIxz − qIyz)
p(qIy − rIyz − pIxy)− q(pIx − qIxy − rIxz)
 (3.47)
Assuming the aircraft is symmetrical in the XbZb plane, the moments of Inertia on
both sides are equal, therefore Iyz = Ixy = 0. The moment equations reduces to

L
M
N
 =

p˙Ix − r˙Ixz
q˙Iy
r˙Iz − p˙Ixz
+

q(rIz − pIxz)− rqIy
r(pIx − rIxz)− p(rIz − pIxz)
pqIy − q(pIx − rIxz)
 (3.48)
L = p˙Ix − r˙Ixz + qr(Iz − Iy)− qpIxz (3.49)
M = q˙Iy + rp(Ix − Iz) + Ixz(p2 − r2) (3.50)
N = r˙Iz − p˙Ixz + pq(Iy − Ix) + qrIxz (3.51)
Another assumption is that the aircraft is symmetrical in XbYb plane, in practice this
might not be the case but the diﬀerence in inertia on both side of the plane is small
enough to be negligible and is approximated as Ixz = 0
L = p˙Ix + qr(Iz − Iy) (3.52)
M = q˙Iy + rp(Ix − Iz) (3.53)
N = r˙Iz + pq(Iy − Ix) (3.54)
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3.2.1 Aircraft Orientation
The location and orientation of the aircraft cannot be defined in the aircraft’s Body-
axes and needs to be expressed in the Earth-axes. This requires transforming the values
expressing the Body-axes with respect to Earth-axes by applying a series of rotations
known as Euler angles. The order that the rotations are applied in is important [7,89].
1. The first rotation is the roll ϕ about the Xe axis.
2. The second rotation is the pitch θ about the Ye axis.
3. The third rotation is the heading ψ about the Ze axis.
3.2.2 Body-axes to Earth-axes transformation
T eB(ψ, θ, ϕ) =

cosψ − sinψ 0
sinψ cosψ 0
0 0 1


cos θ 0 sin θ
0 1 0
− sin θ 0 cos θ


1 0 0
0 cosϕ − sinϕ
0 sinϕ cosϕ
 (3.55)
3.2.3 Earth-axes to Body-axes transformation
TBe (ψ, θ, ϕ) =

1 0 0
0 cosϕ sinϕ
0 − sinϕ cosϕ


cos θ 0 − sin θ
0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ


cosψ sinψ 0
− sinψ cosψ 0
0 0 1
 (3.56)
3.2.4 Gravitational and Thrust Forces
The forces F exerted on the aircraft are composed of the aerodynamic forces of the
aircraft, earth’s gravity and the thrust produced by the aircraft’s engine. This is
expressed as
F = Faw + Fge + Fp (3.57)
where F is the total force exerted on the aircraft. The aerodynamic force contributions
are defined in the Wind-axes Faw = [−D,Y,−Llift]T where D is the drag force, Y is the
side force and Llift is the lift force. The gravitational force contributions are defined in
Earth-axes as Fge = [0, 0,mg]T. The thrust force Fp = [T, 0, 0]T is aligned along the Xb
axis of the aircraft’s Body-axes. This can be diﬀerent for other types of aircraft since
it is dependent on the type and geometric position of the power-plant on the aircraft.
Some aircraft have power-plants that are oﬀset from the Xb axis and have a Yb and
Zb component resulting in oﬀset thrust that contribute to the moment of the aircraft.
This is common on large passenger aircraft that have multiple power-plants such as
Boeing 747 [90] and the Airbus A320. More sophisticated power-plants have Thrust
26
Vectoring capabilities where the direction of thrust can be changed during flight [85].
This is a common feature for Fast Jets used for combat such as the Lockheed Martin
F-22 and the Sukhoi Su-37. For all examples considered in this thesis, it is assumed
that the aircraft’s thrust is aligned along the Xb axis in the aircraft’s Body-axes.
The force components Faw and Fge need to be expressed in the Body-axes. The
aerodynamic forces are rotated about the z axis by side-slip angle β to the stability axis
followed by a rotation about the y axis by the Angle-of-Attack α to the Wind-axes. The
Angle-of-Attack α is the angle between the mean chord line of the wing and the relative
airflow [84]. The side-slip angle β is the angle between the horizontal component of the
velocity vector v and the total velocity Va [7].

Fax
Fay
Faz
 =

cosα 0 − sinα
0 1 0
sinα 0 cosα


cosβ − sin β 0
sin β cosβ 0
0 0 1


−D
Y
−Llift
 (3.58)

Fax
Fay
Faz
 =

cosα cosβ − cosα sin β − sinα
sin β cosβ 0
sinα cosβ − sinα sin β cosα


−D
Y
−Llift
 (3.59)
Fax = −D cosα cosβ − Y cosα sin β + Llift sinα (3.60)
Fay = −D sin β + Y cosβ (3.61)
Faz = −D sinα cosβ − Y sinα sin β − Llift cosα (3.62)
where the Angle-of-Attack and the angle of side-slip are computed as
α = tan−1
(
u− ug
w
)
(3.63)
β = sin−1
(
v − vg
Va
)
(3.64)
where Va is defined as
Va =
√
(u− ug)2 + (v − vg)2 + (w − wg)2 (3.65)
Gravitational Force
The gravitational force is expressed in earth frame of axis. This is converted to body
frame of axis by using the Euler angle rotations.
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Figure 3.2: Aircraft bank 3.2(a) and pitch 3.2(a) orientations

Fgxb
Fgyb
Fgzb
 =

1 0 0
0 cosϕ sinϕ
0 − sinϕ cosϕ


cos θ 0 − sin θ
0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ


0
0
mg
 (3.66)

Fgxb
Fgyb
Fgzb
 =

−mg sin θ
mg cos θ sinϕ
mg cos θ cosϕ
 (3.67)
Equations (3.14), (3.15), (3.16) are substituted into the total force equation (3.57)

m(u˙+ qw − rv)
m(v˙ + ru− pw)
m(w˙ + pv − qu)
 =

−D cosα cosβ − Y cosα sin β + Llift sinα
−D sin β + Y cosβ
−D sinα cosβ − Y sinα sin β − Llift cosα
+

−mg sin θ
mg cos θ sinϕ
mg cos θ cosϕ
+

T
0
0

(3.68)
The Drag D, Lift Llift and side forces Y are a function of dynamic pressure Q, wing
surface area of the aircraft S and various other factors such as the attitude rates and
control surface state. The forces can be defined as
D = QSCD (3.69)
Y = QSCY (3.70)
Llift = QSCL (3.71)
The Drag, Lift and Side force coeﬃcient are CD, CL and CY respectively. These
coeﬃcients are dimensionless and a function of the aircraft’s geometric features such
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as wingspan b, wing chord length c and wing surface area S. The coeﬃcients are
determined experimentally by using a scale model of the aircraft in a wind tunnel and
varying parameters such as α and measuring eﬀect this has on the Force and Moments
exerted on the aircraft [7]. The aerodynamic coeﬃcients are composed of stability
derivatives. The stability derivatives are determined by taking Taylor series expansion
about the trim condition of the aircraft, where all the forces and moments acting on
the aircraft are zero. The change in forces and moments acting on the aircraft due to
change in variables such as control surface deflections are represented by the stability
derivatives.
CL = CL0 + CLαα+ CLββ +
c
2Va
CLqq + CLδe δe (3.72)
CY = CYαα+ CYββ +
b
2Va
(CYpp+ CYrr) + CYδa δa + CYδe δe + CYδr δr (3.73)
CD = CD0 + CkC2L (3.74)
where δa, δe and δr are the control surface deflections of the aircraft’s ailerons, elevator
and rudder respectively. The translation equations of motion are defined as:
u˙ = −Q S
m
(CD cosα cosβ + CY cosα sin β − CL sinα)− g sin θ + T
m
− qw + rv
(3.75)
v˙ = −Q S
m
(CD sin β − CY cosβ) + g cos θ sinϕ− ru+ pw (3.76)
w˙ = −Q S
m
(CD sinα cosβ + CY sinα sin β + CL cosα) + g cos θ cosϕ− pv + qu (3.77)
The moment equations are
L = QSbCl (3.78)
M = QScCm (3.79)
N = QSbCn (3.80)
where Cl, Cm and Cn are the rolling, pitching and yawing moment coeﬃcients.
Cm = Cm0 + Cmαα+ Cmββ +
c
2Va
(Cmα˙α˙+ Cmqq) + Cmδe δe (3.81)
Cl = Clαα+ Clββ +
b
2Va
(Clpp+ Clrr) + Clδa δa + Clδe δe + Clδr δr (3.82)
Cn = Cnαα+ Cnββ +
b
2Va
(Cnpp+ Clqq) + Clδa δa + Clδe δe + Clδr δr (3.83)
The dynamic pressure Q is a function of the air density ρ and the speed Va of the
aircraft. This is defined as
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Q = 12ρV
2
a (3.84)
p˙ = − 1
Ix
[qr(Iz − Iy)−QSbCl] (3.85)
q˙ = − 1
Iy
[rp(Ix − Iz)−QScCm] (3.86)
r˙ = − 1
Iz
[pq(Iy − Ix)−QSbCn] (3.87)
(3.88)
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3.2.5 Navion Aerodynamic coeﬃcients
Table 3.1: Navion aerodynamic coeﬃcients [7]
CL CY Cl Cm Cn
CLo = 0 CY0 = 0 Clo = 0 Cmo = 0 Cno = 0
CLα = 4.44 CYα = 0 Clα = 0 Cmα = −0.683 Cnα = 0
CLβ = 0 CYβ = −0.564 Clβ = −0.074 Cmβ = 0 Cnβ = 0.071
CLα˙ = 0 CYα˙ = 0 Clα˙ = 0 Cmα˙ = −4.36 Cnα˙ = 0
CLp = 0 CYp = 0 Clp = −0.41 Cmp = 0 Cnp = −0.0575
CLq = 3.8 CYq = 0 Clq = 0 Cmq = −9.96 Cnq = 0
CLr = 0 CYr = 0 Clr = 0.107 Cmr = 0 Cnr = −0.125
CLδa = 0 CYδa = 0 Clδa = −0.134 Cmδa = 0 Cnδa = −0.0035
CLδe = 0.355 CYδe = 0 Clδe = 0 Cmδe = −0.923 Cnδe = 0
CLδr = 0 CYδr = 0.157 Clδr = 0.107 Cmδr = 0 Cnδr = −0.072
3.3 Flight Simulation
3.3.1 Level flight conditions
A reference operating point is trimmed level flight where the flight path angle (γ = 0).
The flight path angle is the angle between the aircraft velocity vector in the earth axis
and local horizon (Xe, Ye plane in the earth-axis). In this flight mode the aircraft is at
constant speed (u˙ = v˙ = w˙ = 0) and maintains a constant attitude (p˙ = q˙ = r˙ = p =
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q = r = 0) and wings are level (ϕ = 0) and side-slip angle (β = 0). The elevator angle
δe and engine thrust T needs to be determined to maintain this flight condition at a
given altitude z at a constant airspeed Va. The Angle-of-Attack is constant (α˙ = 0).
Since flight path angle (γ = θ − α = 0) then (θ = α). The lift Llift and weight of the
aircraft are balanced
Llift = mg = QSCL (3.89)
CL =
mg
QS
(3.90)
CL = CL0 + CLαα+ CLδe δe (3.91)
equation (3.91) is rearranged for Angle-of-Attack α to be the subject as
α = CL
CLα
− CL0
CLα
− CLδe δe
CLα
(3.92)
The pitching moment coeﬃcient Cm = 0 equation (3.81) reduces to
0 = Cm0 + Cmαα+ Cmδe δe (3.93)
which is rearranged for the elevator δe to be the subject
δe = − Cm0
Cmδe
− Cmα
Cmδe
α (3.94)
Equation (3.92) is substituted into equation (3.94) to form
δe = − Cm0
Cmδe
− Cmα
Cmδe
(
CL
CLα
− CL0
CLα
− CLδe δe
CLα
)
(3.95)
δe =
−Cm0CLα − CmαCL + CmαCL0
CmδeCLα − CmαCLδe
(3.96)
The required elevator angle to maintain level flight is determined and applied to
equation (3.92) to determine the Angle-of-Attack for the aircraft. The CL is used to
compute CD using equation (3.74). The thrust is determined by equation (3.75) by
T = QSCD cosα (3.97)
3.3.2 Aircraft State Vector
The state of the aircraft is defined by the state vector
X = [x, u, ax, z, w, az, θ, q, q˙, y, v, ay, ψ, p, p˙, ϕ, r, r˙]T (3.98)
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that defines the state of the aircraft mathematically. The elements x, u, u˙, z, w, w˙,
θ, q, q˙ are longitudinal states of the aircraft and y, v, ay, ψ, p, p˙, ϕ, r, r˙ are lateral
states of the aircraft defined by convention [85]. The state elements x, y and z are the
displacements of the aircraft in the Xe, Ye and Ze directions respectively in the Earth-
axes. The state elements u, v and w are the speeds of the aircraft in the Xb, Yb and
Zb directions respectively in the aircraft Body-axes. The state elements ax, ay and az
are the accelerations of the aircraft in the Xb, Yb and Zb directions respectively in the
Body-axes. The state elements ψ, θ and ϕ are relative attitudes of the aircraft body
about the Ze, Ye andXe axes respectively of the Earth-axes. The state elements p, q and
r are the angular rates of the aircraft body about the Xb, Yb and Zb axes respectively
in the aircraft Body-axes. The state elements p˙, q˙ and r˙ are the angular rates of the
aircraft body about the Xb, Yb and Zb axes respectively in Body-axes.
3.3.3 Level Flight Results
An example of the level fight simulation of the SixDoF model is presented below. The
simulation begins in the trimmed condition at an altitude of 5000 ft (1524m) and at a
speed of 150 knots (77.2ms−1).
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Figure 3.3: Longitudinal states for Navion during level flight at 5000 ft (1524m).
Level flight is simulated for 120 seconds. Figure 3.3 show the longitudinal states x,
u, ax, z, w, az, θ, q and q˙ of the aircraft during the simulation. The lateral states y, v,
ay, ψ, p, p˙, ϕ, r and r˙ remain zero since level flight does not induce side force, rolling
and yaw moments. The longitudinal states ax, ay and q˙ show an oscillations at the start
of the simulation that gradually dissipates during the period of the simulation. The
duration of the oscillation is large and causes dependent states to fluctuate. A control
system is required to dampen the oscillation and achieve the target flight condition. The
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acceleration ax oscillates for the period of the simulation. This causes the speed u to
oscillate for the period of the simulation. The flight model needs to be dampened along
the longitudinal axis to reach the desired flight condition quickly. This requirement is
addressed in the next section.
3.4 Autopilot
The objective of the autopilot is to simulate common aircraft flight modes such as level,
climbing, descending and turning flight. This allows test scenarios to be specified that
will generate flight data for testing fault detection algorithms. The autopilot inputs
are the desired heading ψc and altitude zc to be maintained. The change in altitude
and heading is achieved by using a displacement autopilot shown in [7].
To maintain the desired altitude zc, the aircraft needs to be dampened along the
longitudinal axis. Figure 3.3(d) shows an increase in altitude ∆z during the simulation.
This occurs due to the change in displacement accelerations (ax, az) and pitch acceler-
ation q˙. These changes cause oscillation in the speeds u, w and rotational rates q that
result in change in displacements ∆x, ∆z and ∆θ. During level flight the Angle-of-
Attack α needs to be constant to maintain the desired altitude. The α is proportional
to the elevator angle δe to maintain level flight as defined by equation 3.94. However,
the change in pitch rate causes a change in α.
αϵ = α− αk (3.99)
where αϵ is the error, α is the desired Angle-of-Attack and αk is current Angle-of-Attack.
The error in altitude is proportional to the error in the Angle-of-Attack
∆z ∝ tan(αϵ) (3.100)
the small angle approximation tan a ≈ a reduces the equation to
∆z ∝ αϵ (3.101)
∆z = K1αϵ (3.102)
where K1 is a gain.
αϵ =
1
K1
∆z (3.103)
The elevator angle δe required to minimize αϵ is determined
δek+1 = δek + sign(αϵ)
min(Kδe |αϵ|, qmax)
qδe
(3.104)
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where sign(αϵ) =

−1 if αϵ < 0
0 if αϵ = 0
+1 if αϵ > 0

where qδe = qδe is the pitch rate per degree of the elevator angle, δek+1 is the required
elevator angle, δek is the current angle of the elevator for αk. The elevator gain is Kδe .
The pitch rate is limited to qmax.
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Figure 3.4: Longitudinal states for Navion in level flight at 5000ft (1524m) with a dampened
system.
Figure 3.4 shows the damped longitudinal states during level flight.
The heading of the aircraft is controlled by inducing a roll rate p using ailerons.
Inducing a roll causes a bank angle ϕ that changes the heading of the aircraft. The
diﬀerence between the current heading ψ and the desired heading ψc is ∆ψ. This is
the angle between the unit vector of the velocity vector of the aircraft Vˆearth and the
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desired heading vector uc defined
Vˆearth = T eB(ψ, θ, ϕ)Vbody (3.105)
where Vbody = [u, v, w]T is the velocity of the aircraft in the body axis.
uc = T eB(ψc, 0, 0)u (3.106)
where u = [1, 0, 0]T is a unit vector aligned along the X axis of the aircraft body
axis that is rotated by ψc with respect the earth axis. The diﬀerence in heading is
proportional to the required bank angle ϕd
ϕd = sign(∆ψ)min(Kϕ|∆ψ|, ϕmax) (3.107)
where sign(∆ψ) =

−1 if ∆ψ < 0
0 if ∆ψ = 0
+1 if ∆ψ > 0

Kϕ is a gradient and ϕmax is the maximum bank angle limit for the aircraft. This is
determined according to the maximum load factor nmax that the aircraft is capable
of sustaining n = 1cosϕ [91]. For aircraft such as Navion the maximum load factor is
expected to remain between 1 and 2. Assuming nmax = 1.5, a bank limit of ϕmax =
±45◦ is appropriate. The aileron control surface deflection δak+1 is determined by
δak+1 = δak + sign(∆ϕ)
min(Kδa |ϕd|, pmax)
pδa
(3.108)
where sign(∆ϕ) =

−1 if ∆ϕ < 0
0 if ∆ϕ = 0
+1 if ∆ϕ > 0

δak is the current aileron angle of deflection, Kδa is the aileron gain, the roll rate is
limited to pmax and pδa = pδa is the roll rate per degree of the aileron angle.
The aileron deflection also induces a yaw rate that contributes to the side-slip angle
β of the aircraft [85]. The rudder control surface δr is used to minimize the side-slip
angle. The rudder control deflection δrk+1 is determined
δrk+1 = δrk + sign(βk)
min(Kδr |βk|, rmax)
rδr
(3.109)
where sign(βk) =

−1 if βk < 0
0 if βk = 0
+1 if βk > 0

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δrk is the current rudder angle of deflection,Kδr is the rudder gain, rmax is the maximum
yaw rate limit and rδr = rδr is the yaw rate per degree of the aileron angle.
The parameters for the autopilot are:
• K1 = 200
• Kδe = 0.9
• qmax = 10◦s−1
• Kϕ = 5
• ϕmax = 45◦
• Kδa = 1.75
• pmax = 10◦s−1
• Kδr = 10
• rmax = 5◦s−1
3.4.1 Climbing flight
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Figure 3.5: The aircraft climbs and maintains altitude of 1828.8m (6000ft) and heading 0◦.
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3.4.2 Descending flight
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Figure 3.6: The aircraft descends and maintains altitude of 1219.2m (4000ft) and heading 0◦.
3.4.3 Turning flight
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Figure 3.7: The aircraft turns and maintains a heading of 90◦ and altitude of 1219.2m (4000ft).
40
3.5 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the development of a Navion flight model with an
autopilot that represents an Unmanned Aircraft. This will be used as a test platform
in simulation of common flight scenarios. The autopilot is useful for initialising diﬀerent
flight phases such as climbing, descending, turning and level flight. The model can be
used as a test platform to generate data for fault detection algorithms.
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Chapter 4
Sensors and State Estimation
Aircraft systems are reliant on data obtained from on-board sensors to deduce their
state and the state of the environment they are operating within. The measurements
obtained from sensors are inherently noisy and they limit the accuracy of the state
estimate of the aircraft. State estimation methods are used to filter the noise from the
measurements and maintain an accurate estimate of the aircraft’s state, such as the
current altitude, speed and heading of the aircraft. There are diﬀerent types of sensors,
each type of sensor is used to provide specific information related to the state of the
aircraft [80].
Sensors can be categorised as dependent and independent. Dependent sensors are
reliant on distributed systems. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers on-board an aircraft are reliant on the GPS satellite constellation to determine
the aircraft position [92]. This type system is vulnerable, to attacks such as spoofing
and jamming. In contrast, independent sensors are not dependent on external systems
to provide measurements. For example Angle-of-Attack (AoA) sensors are on-board
the aircraft and provide the measurement of the angle between the mean chord of the
wing and the relative airflow. This angle is denoted by α.
The three diﬀerent types of independent sensors that are commonly found on-board
aircraft and are considered for this flight model are an Inertial Measurement Unit, an
Angle-of-Attack sensor and a Pitot-static sensor.
• Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU): Measures the accelerations (ax, ay and az)
and rotation rates (p, q and r) of the aircraft. These are integrated with respect
to time to produce the displacement, velocity, attitude and rotation rate of the
aircraft.
• Angle-of-Attack (AoA) sensor: Measures the angle α between the mean chord of
the aerofoil wing and the relative airflow.
• Pitot-static (PS) sensor: Measures the static pressure Ps and total pressure PT
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encountered during the flight. The static pressure is used determine the baromet-
ric altitude. The total pressure is a sum of the static pressure and the Dynamic
pressure Q. This is used infer the local airspeed aircraft.
This chapter begins by defining the measurement models for the above sensors
based on [80]. Noisy sensor data are simulated by adding zero-mean Gaussian white
noise to the expected measurement determined using the Navion flight model defined
in the previous chapter. White noise is a process where the autocovariance for two
diﬀerent times is zero, ie. the noise is uncorrelated in time [93]. Gaussian noise is used
because of the Central Limit Theorem, where the sum of many noise sources always
(or nearly always) approximates to a Gaussian distribution. Therefore, a Gaussian
distribution is a good model for sensors. However, in practice sensors have bias due to
factors such as imperfect manufacturing processes or coupling eﬀects due to interference
between instruments [94]. The examples in this thesis do not consider such errors. This
approach of using additive white noise has been used in reference [75] and is common
in simulation and modelling. Section 4.2 considers popular state estimation methods
such as Kalman Filter, Extended Kalman Filter and Unscented Kalman Filter to filter
the noise and maintain an accurate estimate of the aircraft state.
4.1 Sensor simulation
4.1.1 Inertial Measurement Unit
Figure 4.1: Inertial Measurement Unit [1]
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The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is located inside the aircraft commonly at or near
the aircraft’s centre of gravity. The IMU is composed of accelerometers and gyroscope
sensors that measure the accelerations and rotational rates of the aircraft respectively.
The position, velocity and orientation of the aircraft are deduced by integrating the
measurements obtained from the IMU over time. This sensor’s measurements are sim-
ulated by adding white noise to the expected output of the sensor. The measurements
obtained at time-step k from the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) are simulated as
Y(IMU)k = h
(IMU)([ax, ay, az, p, q, r]T,VIMU) = [ax, ay, az, p, q, r]T +VIMU (4.1)
where VIMU ∼ N (0, σ2IMU) is the measurement noise and
σ2IMU =

σ2ax 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2ay 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2az 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2p 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2q 0
0 0 0 0 0 σ2r

(4.2)
The variance of the measured accelerations ax,ay and az are σ2ax , σ2ay and σ2az respec-
tively. The variance of rotation rates p, q and r are σ2p, σ2q and σ2r . The covariance have
been assumed negligible. In practice, the magnitude of cross-couplings are non-zero
but the magnitude of these terms are significantly smaller than the diagonal terms and
can be assumed negligible for the purposes of this thesis.
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4.1.2 Angle-of-Attack Sensor
Figure 4.2: Two Angle-of-Attack Sensors on Airbus A330 [2]
This is an external sensor that is mounted on the side of side of the aircraft. It consists
of a vane that rotates as the aircraft pitches. The Angle-of-Attack (AoA) α is the angle
between the mean chord of the aerofoil and the relative airflow. The data from this
sensor are simulated by determining the expected value for α based on the equations
of motion and adding noise terms.
Y
(α)
k = h
(AoA)(uk, wk, Vα) = tan−1
(
uk
wk
)
+ Vα (4.3)
where Vα ∼ N (0, σ2α) and σ2α is the variance of the angle of attack, uk and wk are the
speed aircraft along the X-axis and Z-axis in the aircraft body-axis respectively.
4.1.3 Pitot-static Sensor
The Pitot-static (PS) sensor is an external sensor mounted on the fuselage of the air-
craft. This sensor measures the total pressure PT and static pressure Ps encountered
during flight. These measurements are used to determine the current speed and baro-
metric altitude of the aircraft. The dynamic pressure Q is the diﬀerence between the
total pressure PT and the static pressure Ps; (Q = PT − Ps). The airspeed Va is
proportional to the dynamic pressure and the air density ρ at the current altitude.
The International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) model is used to approximate the air
density ρ and static pressure Ps encountered at a specific altitude [84]. This is a stan-
dard model that has been commonly used for applications such as simulating missiles.
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Figure 4.3: Two Static ports on Airbus A330 [3]
The ISA atmosphere model is constructed by averaging the atmospheric conditions over
the globe and over the seasons, in practice meteorological variations in temperatures
can be modelled by using up to date weather data [84]. Such variations in temperature
are not considered in examples in this thesis.
The air density ρ at a given altitude z is determined
ρ = ρ0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR−1)
(4.4)
where the air density at sea level is ρ0 = 1.225 kgm−3. The lapse rate l = 6.49 Kkm−1.
The temperature at sea level T0 = 288.15 K. The acceleration due to gravity g =
9.81 ms−2. The specific gas constant is R = 287 Jkg−1 K−1. The static pressure Ps at
the current altitude z is simulated
Ps = P0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR)
(4.5)
where the static pressure at sea level is P0 = 101.325 kPa. The dynamic pressure Q is
calculated using
Q = 12ρV
2
a =
1
2ρ0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR−1)
V 2a (4.6)
and the total pressure encountered during flight is given by
PT =
1
2ρ0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR−1)
V 2a + P0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR)
(4.7)
The static pressure Y (Ps)k and the total pressure Y
(PT )
k of the sensor are simulated by
adding noise to the expected total pressure PT and static pressure for the current speed
Va at altitude z.
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Figure 4.4: Pitot tubes on A330 [4]
Y
(Ps)
k = h
(Ps)(z, VPs) = P0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR)
+ VPs (4.8)
Y
(PT )
k = h
(PT )(u, v, w, z, VPT ) (4.9)
= PT + VPT
= 12ρ0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR−1)
(u2 + v2 + w2) + P0
(
1− lz
T0
)( glR)
+ VPT
where VPs ∼ N (0, σ2Ps) and VPT ∼ N (0, σ2PT )
4.2 State Estimation
The noisy sensor outputs must be filtered to obtain an accurate estimate of the aircraft
state. The accuracy such information must be preserved since it aﬀects the actions of
the autopilot.
4.2.1 Kalman Filter
The Kalman Filter (KF) is a popular state estimation method that was proposed by
Rudolf Kalman in 1960 [95]. This method has been used for various applications such
as Navigation [96], Finance [97] and Medicine [98]. The Kalman filter is a recursive
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filter that provides an optimal minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) estimate of the
current state when estimating the state of linear dynamic systems with Gaussian White
noise [93]. A description of the Kalman filter algorithm for a linear dynamic system is
given below [93].
A discrete-time linear system is defined in state-space form
Xk+1|k = FXk + W˜+Bηk (4.10)
where Xk is the state vector that defines the state of the system at time-step k, F is the
transition matrix that is known and defines the linear system process. The process noise
is W˜. The B matrix is the control gain and ηk is the control vector. The measurement
equation is
Yk+1 = HXk +V (4.11)
where Yk+1 is the measurement, H is the measurement matrix and V is the measure-
ment noise. The Kalman filter is initialised with an initial estimate Xˆ0 and initial
error covariance S0 obtained from a series of preliminary measurements at k = 0. The
estimated state of the system at time-step k is Xˆk and is time-updated by
Xˆk+1|k = F Xˆk +Bηk (4.12)
where Xˆk+1|k is the estimated state. The estimated error covariance at time-step k is
Sk and is time-updated by
Sk+1|k = FSkF T + Q˜ (4.13)
where Sk+1 is the predicted error covariance and Q˜ is the process noise covariance. The
Kalman gain G is determined by
G = Sk+1|kHT ([HSk+1|kHT ] +R)−1 (4.14)
where R is the measurement noise covariance. This is followed by updating the state-
estimate Xˆk+1 and error covariance Sk+1 respectively.
Xˆk+1|k+1 = Xˆk+1|k +Gϵ (4.15)
where ϵ is the innovation
ϵ = Yk+1 − [HXˆk+1|k] (4.16)
Sk+1|k+1 = [I −GH]Sk+1|k (4.17)
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The Kalman Filter is optimal for estimating the state of linear systems with linear mea-
surements and Gaussian noise. However, many practical problems require estimating
the state of nonlinear systems and processes. For example, tracking the trajectory of a
ballistic object re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere is very nonlinear [99].
4.2.2 Extended Kalman filter
In the case of nonlinear systems, an extended version of the Kalman Filter known as
the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) [100] is often used. This is where the nonlinear
function is linearised around an estimated point using a Taylor series expansion and the
linearised terms are substituted into the Kalman Filter. The algorithm for a nonlinear
discrete EKF using first-order Taylor series expansion is shown below [93,101,102].
A discrete-time nonlinear system that is defined by
Xk+1|k = f(Xk) + W˜+Bηk (4.18)
where f(...) is a known nonlinear function that propagates the current state Xk to the
next state Xk+1. The measurement equation is
Yk+1 = h(Xk) +V (4.19)
where h(...) is the nonlinear measurement function. To estimate the predicted state
Xˆk+1|k the nonlinear function f(...) is expanded around the most recent estimate Xˆk
using vector Taylor series expansion up to the first-order terms as shown in [101] to
yield
f(X) + W˜ ≈ f(Xˆk) +∇f(Xˆk)(X− Xˆk) + W˜ +Bηk (4.20)
where ∇f is the gradient of the function f(X)
∇f(Xˆk) =

∂f
∂X1
...
∂f
∂Xn
 (4.21)
the Jacobian matrix is
Fk =

∂f1
∂X1
... ∂f1∂Xn
... . . .
...
∂fm
∂X1
... ∂fm∂Xn
 (4.22)
The predicted state Xˆk+1|k is determined by
Xˆk+1|k = f(Xˆk) +Bηk (4.23)
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The predicted error covariance Sk+1|k is determined by equation
Sk+1|k = FkSkF Tk + Q˜ (4.24)
The measurement function is expanded around X = Xˆk+1|k
h(X) + V ≈ h(Xˆk+1|k) +∇h(Xˆk+1|k)(X− Xˆk+1|k) + V (4.25)
where ∇h is the gradient of the function h(Xˆk+1|k)
∇h(Xˆk+1|k) =

∂h
∂X1
...
∂h
∂Xn
 (4.26)
the Jacobian measurement matrix is given by
Hk =

∂h1
∂X1
... ∂h1∂Xn
... . . .
...
∂hm
∂X1
... ∂hm∂Xn
 (4.27)
The measurement matrix is used to calculate the Kalman gain
G = Sk+1|kHTk ([HkSk+1|kHTk ] +R)−1 (4.28)
where R is the measurement noise covariance. This is followed by updating the time-
updated estimate Xˆk+1|k and error covariance Sˆk+1 respectively.
Xˆk+1|k+1 = Xˆk+1|k +G{Yk+1 − [h(Xˆk+1|k)]} (4.29)
where Yk+1 is the measurement vector.
Sk+1|k+1 = [I −GHk]Sk+1|k (4.30)
The main diﬀerence between the Kalman Filter and Extended Kalman Filter is the
evaluation of the Jacobian matrices that are used within the Kalman Filter. In the
case of second-order or a ‘Higher-order’ EKF – the second or higher order terms of
the Taylor series expansion are used which require computing the Hessian matrices
that are the derivatives of the Jacobian matrices. However, including higher order
terms does not guarantee accuracy of the estimate since the linearisation is conducted
around the latest estimate because the actual state is not available, therefore errors in
the estimated state are propagated to the linearised approximation of the system [93].
Unless the EKF is initialised with accurate measurements and the error propagation is
well approximated, the error increases and the estimate departs from the true state of
the system [93]. This is a well known problem within the target tracking community
that has been encountered for applications such as estimating the ballistic parameters
of missiles [103,104].
50
4.2.3 Unscented Transformation
The Unscented Transformation (UT) proposed by Julier et al. addresses the lineari-
sation issues faced by the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) [105]. The UT is founded
on the intuition that it is easier to approximate a probability distribution than it is to
approximate an arbitrary nonlinear function or transformation [5]. The UT method
draws a set of sigma points with mean Xˆk and covariance Sk. A nonlinear function
is applied to each of the sigma points. The mean and covariance of the transformed
sigma points represent the mean and covariance of the nonlinear transformation.
Figure 4.5: The Unscented Transform – a nonlinear function is applied to a set of sigma
points [5]
Consider the nonlinear measurement equation (4.19). The measurement Yk+1 with
dimension ny × 1 is observed for the current state of the system Xk+1 with dimension
nx × 1. The sigma points are determined by
X(0) = Xk (4.31)
X(i) = Xk +
(√
nxS
)
i
i = 1, ..., nx (4.32)
X(i+nx) = Xk −
(√
nxS
)
i
i = 1, ..., nx (4.33)
where
√
nxS is the square root of the matrix nxS and S is the error covariance. The
subscript i in
(√
nxS
)
i
within equations 4.32 and 4.33 refers to the ith column in
the matrix nxS. The sigma points are propagated using the non-linear measurement
function h(...).
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Y (i) = h(X(i)k ) i = 0, ..., 2nx (4.34)
The mean of the transformed sigma points are calculated
Yˆ =
nY∑
i=0
W (i)Y (i) (4.35)
where W (i) = 12nx are the weights of the sigma points. The weight (gain) matrix is
chosen to minimise the trace of the updated covariance [5]. The covariance of the sigma
points, S, is calculated as
S =
nY∑
i=0
W(i)(Y (i) − Yˆ)(Y (i) − Yˆ)T i = 0, ..., 2ny (4.36)
This approach captures the second order linearisation information of the nonlinear
transformation without the need for a second order Taylor series expansion. The Un-
scented Transformation can be generalised in the Unscented Kalman Filter [101]. The
Unscented Kalman Filter provides an improved performance in state estimation when
compared to Extended Kalman Filter for nonlinear systems [101]. The EKF requires
the computation of the Jacobian and in some cases – Hessian matrices, the derivative of
Jacobian matrices. It is therefore suited to analytical process and measurement equa-
tions [101]. However, in practice, some systems cannot be defined analytically and it is
numerically diﬃcult to compute Jacobian matrices [101]. For example, the Navion flight
model defined in the previous chapter consists of nonlinear dynamics. Such nonlinear
problems have been known to cause increased complexity when computing Jacobian or
Hessian Matrices [5].
The general form of the Unscented Kalman filter assumes that process and mea-
surement noise is additive and that the covariance is constant. However, estimating
the state of nonlinear systems where the noise covariance changes and/or is within
the nonlinear function (not additive) requires the simulation of the noise within the
nonlinear function.
4.2.4 Augmented Unscented Kalman Filter Algorithm
The augmented form of the UKF [5, 106] is suitable for the estimation of the state of
nonlinear systems where the noise is within the nonlinear function and the covariance
of the noise changes. It provides a method to estimate the properties of the noise
alongside the state estimates.
The augmented state vector Xa is defined as
Xak = [Xˆk W˜ V]T (4.37)
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where Xˆk = [xˆ, uˆ, aˆx, zˆ, wˆ, aˆz, θˆ, qˆ, ˆ˙q, yˆ, vˆ, aˆy, ψˆ, pˆ, ˆ˙p, ϕˆ, rˆ, ˆ˙r]T is the estimated state of the
aircraft and the state elements are as mentioned in the previous chapter section 3.3.2.
The process noise is W˜ and the measurement noise is V. The total dimension of the
augmented state vector is na = nx + nw + nv where nx, nw and nv are the dimensions
of the state-estimate, process noise and measurement noise vectors respectively. The
augmented covariance matrix is defined as:
Sak =

Sk 0 0
0 Q˜ 0
0 0 R
 (4.38)
where Sk, Q˜ and R are the error, process noise and measurement noise covariances
respectively.
Q˜ =

Q˜σ
σax
∆T 0 0 0 0 0
0 Q˜σ
σay
∆T 0 0 0 0
0 0 Q˜σ
σaz
∆T 0 0 0
0 0 0 Q˜σ
σp˙
∆T 0 0
0 0 0 0 Q˜σ
σq˙
∆T 0
0 0 0 0 0 Q˜σ σr˙∆T

(4.39)
where Q˜σ is
Q˜σ =

∆T 5
20
∆T 4
8
∆T 3
6
∆T 4
8
∆T 3
3
∆T 2
2
∆T 3
6
∆T 2
2 ∆T
 (4.40)
R =

σ2IMU 0 0 0
0 σ2α 0 0
0 0 σ2Ps 0
0 0 0 σ2PT
 (4.41)
The 2na sigma vectors Xak are composed as
X(0)ak = [Xˆ
T
k 01×nw 01×nv ]T (4.42)
X(i)ak = X
(0)
ak
+
√
(na + λ)Sak i = 1, ..., na (4.43)
X(i)ak = X
(0)
ak
−
√
(na + λ)Sak i = (na + 1), ..., 2na (4.44)
53
where the scaling parameter λ is
λ = (na + κ)ζ2 − na (4.45)
where ζ defined the spread of the sigma points fromX(0)ak and κ. To clarify, the structure
of the ith sigma point is X(i)ak = [X
T
aXˆ
k
,XTaW ,X
T
aV ]T where X
T
aXˆ
k
is the current state-
estimate of the aircraft, XTaW is the process noise component of the sigma point and
XTaV is the sensor noise component of the sigma point.
The Weightings Wm and Wc are composed as:
Wm0 =
λ
na + λ
(4.46)
Wc0 = (1− ζ2 + ξ) +Wm0 (4.47)
Wmi = Wci =
1
2(na + λ)
i = 1, ..., 2na (4.48)
Time update
The sigma points are propagated using the Navion dynamics function fnavion(...) (rep-
resented by algorithm 3 in Appendix A)
X(i)
aXˆ
k+1|k
= fnavion(X(i)
aXˆ
k
,X(i)
aW
k
, ηk) i = 1, ..., 2na (4.49)
where X(i)
aXˆ
k
is the current state-estimate of the aircraft, X(i)
aW
k
is the process noise and
ηk = [δa, δe, δr, T ]T is the control vector. The aircraft state estimate is given by
Xˆ
aXˆ
k+1|k
=
2na∑
i=0
WmiX
(i)
aXˆ
k+1|k
(4.50)
where Xˆ
aXˆ
k+1|k
is the current state-estimate of the aircraft. The error covariance of the
estimate is given by
Sxxk+1|k =
2na∑
i=0
Wci [XˆaXˆ
k+1|k
−X(i)
aXˆ
k+1|k
][Xˆ
aXˆ
k+1|k
−X(i)
aXˆ
k+1|k
]T (4.51)
Measurement update
The update stage begins by determining the expected measurements of the time up-
dated sigma points X(i)
aXˆ
k+1|k
. The sigma points are input into the sensor measurement
functions defined in section 4.1.
The expected measurement for the IMU is determined by equation (4.1)
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Y(IMU,i)k = h
(IMU)([a(i)z , a(i)y , a(i)z , p(i), q(i), r(i)]T,X
(i)
a
VIMU
k+1|k
) i = 0, ..., 2na (4.52)
where Y(IMU,i)k is the expected measurement of the IMU sensor for the ith sigma point,
the elements a(i)x , a(i)y , a(i)z p(i) q(i) and r(i) are obtained from the X(i)aX
k+1|k
vector and
X(i)
a
VIMU
k+1|k
are the elements of the sigma point representing the IMU measurement noise.
The expected measurement for the AoA is determined by equation (4.3)
Y
(AoA,i)
k = h
(AoA)(u(i), w(i),X(i)
a
VAoA
k+1|k
) i = 0, ..., 2na (4.53)
where Y (AoA,i)k is the expected measurement of the AoA sensor for the ith sigma point,
the elements u(i) and w(i) are the elements obtained from theX(i)
aX
k+1|k
vector andX(i)
a
VAoA
k+1|k
are the elements of the sigma point representing the AoA measurement noise.
Y
(Ps,i)
k = h
(Ps)(z(i),X(i)
a
VPs
k+1|k
) i = 0, ..., 2na (4.54)
where Y (Ps,i)k is the expected measurement of the static pressure from the pitot static
sensor for the ith sigma point, the element z(i) is obtained from the X(i)
aX
k+1|k
vector and
X(i)
a
VPs
k+1|k
are the elements of the propagated sigma point representing the static pressure
measurement noise.
Y
(PT ,i)
k = h
(PT )(u(i), v(i), w(i), z(i),X(i)
a
VPT
k+1|k
) i = 0, ..., 2na (4.55)
where Y (PT ,i)k is the expected measurement of the total pressure from the pitot static
sensor for the ith sigma point, the elements u(i), v(i), w(i) and z(i) are obtained from the
X(i)
aX
k+1|k
vector and X(i)
a
VPT
k+1|k
are the elements of the propagated sigma point representing
the total pressure measurement noise.
The expected measurement Yˆk+1 is composed of the expected measurements ob-
tained from each sensor. This is
Yˆ(i)k+1 = [Y
(IMU,i)T
k , Y
(AoA,i)
k , Y
(Ps,i)
k , Y
(PT ,i)
k ]
T i = 0, ..., 2na (4.56)
Yˆk+1 =
2na∑
i=0
WmiY
(i)
k+1 (4.57)
where Yˆk+1 is the estimated measurement of the sensors. The measurement covariance
is calculated by
Syyk+1 =
2na∑
i=0
Wci [Yˆk+1 −Y(i)k+1][Yˆk+1 −Y(i)k+1]T (4.58)
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The cross covariance between the estimated state and measurement estimate is calcu-
lated
Sxyk+1 =
2na∑
i=0
Wci [Xˆk+1|k −X(i)aXˆ
k+1|k
][Yˆk+1 −Y(i)k+1]T (4.59)
where Sxyk+1 and Syyk+1 are the measured state and innovation covariances respectively.
The Kalman Gain K is calculated as
K = Sxyk+1S−1yyk+1 (4.60)
The state-estimate Xˆk+1|k+1 and error covariance Sxxk+1|k+1 are updated using Kalman
gain K. The measurement innovation is
ϵ = Yk − Yˆk+1 (4.61)
where Yk is the measurement obtained from the sensor. The state-estimate is updated
Xˆk+1|k+1,yk = Xˆk+1|k +Kϵ (4.62)
The error covariance is updated
Sxxk+1|k+1,yk
= Sxxk+1 +KSyyk+1KT (4.63)
The updated state-estimate Xˆk+1|k+1 obtained from the UKF algorithm is provided to
the autopilot.
4.3 Simulation
The sensors are added to the flight model and tested by simulating a series of common
flight scenarios as presented in the previous chapter. The Navion SixDoF flight model
is assumed to have 3 Pitot-static, 2 Angle-of-attack and an Inertial Measurement Unit.
Noisy sensor data is generated by simulation. The Augmented Unscented Kalman
Filter is used filter the noise and provide a state-estimate to the autopilot. Figure 4.6
illustrates simulation flow diagram where Xˆ0 is the initial state estimate of the aircraft,
X0 is the initial state of the aircraft, C = [ψc, zc]T is the control input to the autopilot
and ηk+1 are the controls from the autopilot to the aircraft.
The four common flight scenarios are simulated with aircraft’s initial conditions of
an altitude of 5000 ft (1524m), heading 000◦ and speed of 150 knots(77.2ms−1). The
simulation is initialised with the following parameters:
• True state of aircraft X0 = [0, 77.2, 0, 1524,01×14]T
• Aircraft controls at trimmed state η = [0, −2.3◦, 0, 3600N ]T
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Figure 4.6: Simulation Flow diagram
• Initial aircraft estimate Xˆ0: initialised by three sets of measurements obtained
from the Pitot-static, Angle-of-Attack and Inertial Measurement Unit sensors.
• Inertial Measurement Unit [107]
VIMU ∼ N (0, σ2IMU)
σ2IMU =

0.22 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.22 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.22 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.012 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.012 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.012

(4.64)
• Angle of attack sensor [108]
Vα ∼ N (0, 0.25◦)
• Pitot-static sensor [75]
VPs ∼ N (0, 0.1)
VPT ∼ N (0, 0.1)
b = 0.01
• Process noise parameters
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σax = 0.1686
σay = 0.175
σq˙ = 0.0321
σaz = 0.1686
σp˙ = 0.0683
σr˙ = 0.0026
4.3.1 Level flight
Figure 4.7 shows the altitude and heading of the aircraft during the level flight test.
The aircraft maintains an altitude of 5000ft (1524m) (as shown in Figure 4.7a) and a
heading of 0◦ as expected (as shown in Figure 4.7b).
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Figure 4.7: Altitude and Heading during level flight
4.3.2 Climbing flight
Figure 4.8 shows the altitude and heading of the aircraft during the climbing flight test.
The aircraft climbs to and maintains an altitude of 6000ft (1828.8m) as expected (as
shown in Figure 4.8a). The aircraft maintains a heading of 0◦ as expected (as shown
in Figure 4.8b).
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Figure 4.8: Altitude and Heading during climbing flight
4.3.3 Descending flight
Figure 4.9 shows the altitude and heading of the aircraft during the descending flight
test. The aircraft descends to and maintains an altitude of 4000ft (1219.2m) as expected
(as shown in Figure 4.9a). The aircraft maintains a heading of 0◦ as expected (as shown
in Figure 4.9b).
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Figure 4.9: Altitude and Heading during Descending flight
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4.3.4 Turning flight
Figure 4.10 shows the altitude and heading of the aircraft during the turning flight test.
The aircraft maintains an altitude of 5000ft (1524m) (as shown in Figure 4.10a) and
turns towards a heading of 090◦ as expected (as shown in Figure 4.10b).
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Figure 4.10: Altitude and Heading during turning flight
During the four test scenarios the aircraft is able to successfully reach and maintain
the desired flight conditions as specified by the autopilot.
4.4 Summary
This chapter has defined sensor models that simulate noisy measurements based on the
Navion flight model developed in the previous chapter. The noisy measurements are
filtered using the Augmented Unscented Kalman Filter to maintain an accurate state-
estimate of the aircraft. The state-estimate of the aircraft is input into the autopilot
and a series of common flight scenarios are demonstrated successfully. A Six-Degrees-
of-Freedom flight model for a Navion aircraft with sensors and an Autopilot has been
developed to be used as a test bed.
60
Chapter 5
Sensor Fault Detection
The ability to maintain accurate awareness of the current state of the aircraft and
its immediate environment is a crucial requirement for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS). This awareness is dependent on data obtained from sensors on-board the UAS.
Faulty sensor data leads to a false sense of awareness of the state of the aircraft and
this causes incorrect actions to be commanded. This leads to a failure in accomplishing
the mission, or worse results in the loss of the aircraft which could cause collateral
damage. The absence of flight crew on-board UAS requires a robust fault detection
system, since there can be no manual override on-board the aircraft.
A popular fault detection method is the use of stochastic state estimation methods
where the innovation is used as residual for fault detection [73]. Initial fault detection
and isolation using the innovation from the Kalman Filter was proposed by Mehra and
Peschon [109], where faults were detected by statistical testing of the mean and co-
variance. For example, in normal (fault-free) conditions, the innovation of the Kalman
Filter is expected to be white noise with zero-mean and known covariance [73,109].
The Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) is an extension of this approach
where a bank of Kalman filters are run in parallel and each filter represents a hypothesis
for the behaviour of the system being estimated [72]. Each filter is based on the
expected behaviour of the system when a fault has occurred or has not occurred. The
measurement obtained from a sensor is used to determine the innovation for each filter.
The innovations of each of the filters are used to determine the probabilities that each
model matches the current state of the system. This is modelled on a particular type of
fault and is used to deduce whether a particular fault has occurred and the confidence
for that fault is the probability determined for the model. The overall state-estimate
of the system is the weighted sum of the estimates output by each filter in the bank.
The weights are proportional to the filter probability [79]. Each filter is initialised
and re-initialised using its own estimate and each filter is running independently and
there is no interaction between filters. This approach has been found to be suitable
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for fault detection problems with unknown structure or parameter [79]. But this is not
suitable for FDD scenarios where the system structure or parameter changes. The lack
of interaction between the models causes faults to be miss-identified and/or false alarms
due to degradation of the state-estimate [79]. This problem is addressed by allowing
interaction between the models. In its simplest form, each model is re-initialised at
every time-step by the overall state-estimate obtained from the previous iteration [79].
This is known as the Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 [110]. A more complex form of this is
the Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) that ‘switches’ between models in a probabilistic
manner [79]. The ‘switching’ feature preserves the accuracy of the estimate since the
filter switches to the model that best represents the current state of the system due to
the change in system structure and/or parameter changes.
For nonlinear problems the Kalman Filter is known to be non-optimal and the
EKF and UKF have been used instead. For example, Cork and Walker have imple-
mented a fault detection method for detecting IMU faults on-board an aircraft using
an IMM [111]. The nonlinear dynamics of the aircraft were estimated using a bank of
UKFs. The filters represent the behaviour of diﬀerent combinations of IMU failures.
To clarify, an IMU consists of six sensors (three accelerometers and three gyroscopes
as described in chapter 4). There are 26 diﬀerent combinations of sensor faults. This is
modelled by a combination of 64 parallel UKF filters that represent the hypotheses of
the combination of diﬀerent failures. The increased number of sensors incurs increased
computational load to model all possible failures [111]. If additional sensors are in-
cluded, such as the Angle-of-Attack and Pitot-static sensors considered in the previous
chapter, this will result in increased computational load due to the increased number
of filters (28 = 256).
Another approach is to evaluate the hypothesis of each sensor in sequence. This
reduces the number of models required for detecting multiple sensor faults. For situ-
ations where the hypotheses for a large number of sensors is required; particle filters
are suitable to evaluate the sensor hypotheses in parallel. Cheng Qi et al. present
a distributed fault detection method using particle filters based on state estimation
theory for multiple sensor platforms [112]. Each detector for each sensor makes a local
decision for the individual sensor. Each sensor on the platform evaluates a hypothesis
based on its observations to determine the likelihood that it is operating in normal or
faulty mode. The local decision obtained from each detector attached to the sensor is
passed to the global decision centre, where all decisions are fused to carry out a global
decision.
Liu et al. have proposed multiple sensor fault detection for surveillance in Air
Traﬃc Control using hybrid estimation algorithms [113]. The two types of sensors
are considered in this work are Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-
B) [49] and Multilateration [114,115]. Multilateration is a form of navigation that uses
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radio beacons to determine the position of the aircraft based on the time diﬀerence
of arrival (TDOA). Successful implementation of Multilateration are LORAN [116]
and OMEGA [113]. Both ADS-B and Multilateration sensors in reference [113] have
an estimation algorithm running in parallel, the estimate obtained from each sensor
is fused together using a hybrid algorithm inspired by the IMM algorithm [93]. The
proposed algorithm was tested with a linearised aircraft model in common flight modes.
These modes are: coordinated turn, constant velocity and constant descent. This
method’s feature of running estimation algorithms in parallel might not be feasible for
an increased number of sensors because this will increase the amount of time required
to update the state-estimate.
Here, an approach is adopted where each sensor’s data is considered in sequence
using a Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 (GPB-1) method which consider the hypotheses
for each sensor in sequence. This approach is likely to reduce the accuracy relative
to an IMM, but the use of a GPB-1 oﬀers a compromise between performance and
computational expense [93].
This chapter begins by defining the fault simulation model for each sensor on-board
the Navion aircraft model mentioned in chapter 4. A multiple sensor fault detection
method using Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 (GPB-1) is proposed which updates the
state-estimate of the aircraft with measurements obtained from each sensor sequentially
in section 5.2. The fault detection method is tested by simulating a series of common
flight modes in section 5.3. The accuracy and time taken to update the state-estimate is
compared with a parallel implementation of the GPB-1 multiple sensor fault detection
method in section 5.4.
5.1 Sensor Fault simulation
5.1.1 Inertial Measurement Unit
The fault mode of this sensor is simulated by zeroing the acceleration and rotational
rates of the sensor and adding extra noise as shown in [111]. This is a standard form
of fault simulation.
Y
(IMU∗)
k = VIMU∗ (5.1)
This represents the IMU measuring ax = ay = az = p = q = r = 0 and VIMU∗ >> VIMU.
The ‘*’ symbol indicates the faulty sensor measurements.
5.1.2 Angle-of-Attack
This sensor is susceptible to faults such as freezing due to adverse weather conditions.
One fault mode is where the sensor is frozen. In this mode, the vane will be in a stuck
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position despite a change in the Angle-of-Attack of the aircraft. This type of fault is
simulated as
Y
(α∗)
k = αF + Vα∗ (5.2)
where αF is the expected value of the Angle-of-Attack α (chapter 4) when the fault
event occurs and Vα∗ >> Vα. Another fault mode is when the sensor is partially frozen.
This aﬀects the angular rate of rotation of the vane by a delay. This type of fault can
be simulated using
Y
(α∗)
k = αk−1 +
∆t
c
(αk − αk−1) + Vα∗ (5.3)
where c is a delay constant and ∆t is the period of the time step between consecutive
states. This fault replicates a delay eﬀect due to partial freezing.
5.1.3 Pitot-static Sensor
This sensor is susceptible to blockages caused by debris and ice during operations in
adverse weather conditions. Such blockages causes the sensor to output faulty mea-
surements. The data output from a system with a blocked pitot inlet is an abrupt
increase or decrease in pressure due to the blockage.
Y
(PT ∗)
k = PT + VPT ∗ + b (5.4)
Y
(Ps∗)
k = Ps + VPs∗ + b (5.5)
where b is the bias [75]. A partially blocked pitot inlet and a static source will show
gradual variations in speed, it is simulated using the equation
Y
(PT∼)
k = PT + VPT ∗ + b sin(2pift) (5.6)
Y
(Ps∼)
k = Ps + VPs∗ + b sin(2pift) (5.7)
where f is the frequency of the time-varying eﬀect in the partial fault mode. This
replicates the eﬀect of water and ice crystals partially blocking the pitot tube within
the sensors and is based on reference [75]. VPT ∗ >> VPT and VPs∗ >> VPs
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Table 5.1: Simulated Sensor Faults
Event Sensor Sensor Fault Fault Start
ID i index j type type e equation(s) Time (s) ts
1 1 Pitot Partial Block 5.6,5.7 1
2 4 AoA Partial Block 5.3 1.5
3 2 Pitot Partial Block 5.6,5.7 1.5
4 5 AoA Partial Block 5.3 2.5
5 3 Pitot Partial Block 5.6,5.7 3
6 1 Pitot Block 5.4,5.5 2
7 4 AoA Block 5.3 3
8 2 Pitot Block 5.4,5.5 2.5
9 5 AoA Block 5.3 3.5
10 3 Pitot Block 5.4,5.5 4
11 6 IMU fault 5.1 12
5.1.4 Faulty sensor test scenarios
The problem of faulty sensor data misleading the aircraft’s autopilot is demonstrated
by simulating the sensor faults shown in Table 5.1. The faults are simulated during the
four common (Level, Climbing, Descending and Turning) flight modes demonstrated
in the previous chapters using the Navion SixDoF simulation.
Figure 5.1 shows the altitude of the aircraft (AC1) during the four common flight
scenarios. Figure 5.1(e) shows the heading during the turning flight scenario. The
vertical red lines represents the instant that a sensor fault occurs and corresponds
to the faults in Table 5.1. In all four scenarios the aircraft is unable to achieve the
autopilot’s target state. This is because faulty sensor data corrupt the state-estimate
of the aircraft.
5.2 Multiple sensor fault detection using sequential UKF
Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1
To prevent the state-estimate from being corrupted, the hypotheses that the sensor is
operating normally or faulty must be verified from a series of measurements obtained
from the sensor. The Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 approach to detect a faulty sensor is
to calculate the likelihood that the measurement is normal (fault-free) L and the like-
lihood that it is faulty L(∗) and update the state-estimate according to the proportion
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Figure 5.1: The eﬀect of sensor faults on the altitude of the aircraft during the four common
flight modes: Level flight, Ascending flight, Descending flight and Turning flight.
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Figure 5.2: Flow diagram for UKF-GPB-1 multiple sensor fault detection evaluating hypotheses
sequentially
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of the likelihoods [117].
Figure 5.2 shows a flow diagram for the UKF-GPB-1 sequential multiple sensor fault
detection process that is used to preserve the accuracy of state-estimate of the aircraft.
The process begins with the ‘UKF Predict’ stage, where the current state-estimate
Xˆk+1 and error covariance Sk+1 are time updated to Xˆk+1|k and Sxxk+1|k respectively
as defined by equation (4.49) in the previous chapter. The measurement update stage
consists of two update models – one represents the hypothesis that the sensor is oper-
ating normally and is shown as ‘UKF-Update: Normal Mode’ the other represents the
hypothesis that it is faulty and is shown as ‘UKF-Update: Faulty Mode’. Both models
update the state-estimate and error covariance with the measurement obtained from
the sensor. The state-estimate and error covariance output from the normal model is
Xˆ(j)k+1|k+1, and S
(j)
xxk+1 respectively. The state-estimate and error covariance output from
the faulty model is Xˆ(j∗)k+1|k+1 and S
(j∗)
xxk+1 respectively. The estimates and covariances
from both models are fused proportional to the likelihood that the sensor is operating
normally or faulty. The likelihood is determined by evaluating the probability density
of the sensor measurement within a Gaussian approximated probability distribution
defined by the estimated measurement and measurement covariance determined during
the update stage. The likelihood L(j) for ‘UKF-Update: Normal Mode’ is determined
by
L(j) = p(Y(j)k |Yˆ
(j)
k+1, S
(j)
yyk+1) (5.8)
where Y(j)k is the measurement obtained from the jth sensor. The estimated measure-
ment is Yˆ(j)k+1 and the measurement covariance S
(j)
yyk+1 is calculated during the normal
sensor update model by using equations (4.57) and (4.58) respectively. The likelihood
L(j∗) for ’UKF-Update: Faulty Mode’ is determined
L(j∗) = p(Y(j)k |Yˆ
(j∗)
k+1, S
(j∗)
yyk+1) (5.9)
where Yˆ(j∗)k+1 and S
(j∗)
yyk+1 are the estimated measurement and measurement covariance
calculated during the faulty sensor update by equations (4.57) and (4.58) respectively.
The likelihoods are normalised
Lˆ(j) = L
(j)
L(j) + L(j∗)
(5.10)
Lˆ(j∗) = L
(j∗)
L(j) + L(j∗)
(5.11)
The normalised likelihoods are used to indicate whether the sensor that provided the
measurement Y(j) is normal or faulty. When Lˆ(j) > Lˆ(j∗) the sensor is operating
normally and when Lˆ(j∗) > Lˆ(j) the sensor is faulty [73]. In practice, when Lˆ(j∗) > 0
68
this indicates a faulty sensor. The state-estimate and error covariance obtained from
both models are fused
Xˆk+1|k+1 = aLˆ(j)Xˆ
(j)
k+1|k+1 + (1− a)Lˆ(j∗)Xˆ
(j∗)
k+1|k+1 (5.12)
D1 = [Xˆ
(j)
k+1|k+1 − Xˆk+1|k+1][Xˆ
(j)
k+1|k+1 − Xˆk+1|k+1]T (5.13)
D2 = [Xˆ
(j∗)
k+1|k+1 − Xˆk+1|k+1][Xˆ
(j∗)
k+1|k+1 − Xˆk+1|k+1]T (5.14)
Sxxk+1 = Lˆ(j)S(j)xxk+1D1 + Lˆ
(j∗)S(j∗)xxk+1D2 (5.15)
where a is the probability that the sensor is functioning normally – this has to be
estimated empirically by the sensor manufacturer through rigorous testing [80].
The diﬀerence between the normal and faulty update models is the measurement
covariance R. The faulty sensor UKF model is assumed to have a significantly larger
measurement covariance R∗ than the measurement covariance used in the normal UKF
(R∗ >> R). This is to detect the erratic and inconsistent nature of faulty sensor
measurements that have a large variance. This can be observed in the black box data
recovered from the AF477 crash – that shows large abrupt variations in airspeed prior
to the crash [4]. This update process is repeated for each sensor until the nth sensor
has been reached as shown in Figure 5.2.
5.3 Results
The UKF-GPB-1 fault detection method is tested for the same flight scenarios with the
same faults as the previous section. The aircraft without fault detection is designated
AC1 and the aircraft with the GPB-1 sensor fault detector is designated AC2.
5.3.1 Level Flight
Figure 5.3 shows the altitude of both aircraft during the level flight scenario. AC2
compared to AC1 loses altitude at a lower rate after all the sensors have failed. The
GPB-1 fault detection method is able to detect the likelihood of faults and preserve
the accuracy of the state-estimate.
Figure 5.4 are fault likelihood plots for each sensor on the aircraft during the level
flight scenario. The fault likelihood plots are used to detect the occurrence of a fault
within a sensor. The sensor’s normalised likelihoods for normal mode Lˆ(j) and faulty
mode Lˆ(j∗) are plotted as blue and red lines respectively. This is used to indicate if a
fault has been detected in the sensor. A fault is detected when the red line increases
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Figure 5.3: Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during level flight
scenario.
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Figure 5.4: Fault likelihood for sensors during Level Flight
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and the blue line decreases. A series of black markers at 0.5 have been plotted to
indicate the period when the sensor is producing faulty measurements. The vertical
red lines mark the instant a sensor fault event begins as mentioned in Table 5.1.
The fault likelihood plots for the pitot sensors shown in Figures 5.4(a), 5.4(b)
and 5.4(c) indicate that the faults are detected promptly. This is because of the nature
of the fault encountered – a partially blocked or blocked pitot-static shows an abrupt
oﬀset from the expected measurement of a sensor operating normally. This is detected
as an outlier of the innovation distribution.
In contrast the fault likelihood plots for the AoA sensors shown in Figures 5.4(d)
and 5.4(e) indicate that the AoA faults take time to be detected. This is because the
expected AoA measurement is near constant and doesn’t change very much during the
course of the flight. This is similar to the output of a frozen or partially frozen sensor.
It takes time for the faulty sensor measurements to accumulate for it to be detected as
an outlier of the innovation distribution. The abrupt fluctuations between faulty and
normal are due to the measurements being close to the faulty and normal estimated
sensor measurement distribution, where as time increases some measurements are close
to both distributions. Similarly, the fault likelihood for the IMU sensor shown in
Figure 5.4(f) takes time to be detected since the expected rotational rates (p, q, r) and
accelerations (ax, ay, az) during level flight are close to zero. This coincides with the
nature of the fault encountered.
5.3.2 Climbing flight
The climbing flight scenario shows the altitude of both aircraft, climbing at approxi-
mately the same rate. AC1 has a brief increase in the climb rate due to the increased
error in the state-estimate after the IMU fault event. The final trajectory of AC1 shows
the beginning of a descent. In comparison, AC2 shows a slight reduction in the climb
rate.
The sensor fault likelihood plots in figure 5.6 shows that all faults are detected for
AC2 within the duration that each sensor is faulty. The fault likelihood plots for pitot
sensors 2 and 3 shown in Figures 5.6(b) and 5.6(c) respectively, indicate a false alarm
at t = 1 which coincides with true detection for sensor 1. This is because the aircraft is
in transient mode as the aircraft enters the climb. The abrupt change in speed caused
an abrupt change in total pressure, resulting in a false alarm.
The fault likelihood plots for AoA Sensors 4 and 5 (AoA) shown in Figures 5.6(d)
and Figures 5.6(e) respectively takes time to indicate a fault, this is due to similar
reasons as noted in level flight scenario where the AoA is near constant. The fault
likelihood plots for the IMU sensor are detected instantaneously since the expected
accelerations and rotation rates are near zero. The measurements obtained from the
IMU are close to normal and faulty mode distributions where some of the fault ob-
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Figure 5.5: Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during climbing flight
scenario.
73
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 1 Likelihood (pitot)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 2 Likelihood (pitot)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(b)
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 3 Likelihood (pitot)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(c)
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 4 Likelihood (AOA)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(d)
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 5 Likelihood (AOA)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(e)
0 5 10 15 20 25
seconds
0
0.5
1
1.5
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
Sensor 6 Likelihood (IMU)
Normal
Faulty
Fault Event
(f)
Figure 5.6: Fault likelihood for sensors during Climbing Flight
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Figure 5.7: Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during descending
flight scenario.
servations coincide with the expected normal sensor observations these cause abrupt
changes between normal and faulty detections.
5.3.3 Descending flight
The descending flight scenario shows both AC1 and AC2 descending to the target
altitude as shown in Figure 5.7. AC1 continues to descend below the target altitude,
whereas AC2 is able to descend and maintain the target altitude. The sensor fault
detection shown in Figure 5.8 is similar to previous scenarios, where the pitot and IMU
sensor fault detection is instantaneous and the AoA sensor takes time to detect the
fault. This is to be expected, for the same reasons as the previous scenario.
5.3.4 Turning flight
The turning flight scenario shows AC1 is unable to maintain altitude during the right
turn, whereas AC2 maintains level flight during the turn. Furthermore, Figure 5.9
shows AC1 making an abrupt change in heading which is not the same as the target
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Figure 5.8: Fault likelihood for sensors during descending Flight
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Figure 5.9: Altitude of aircraft using UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection during turning flight
scenario.
heading. AC2’s change in heading is constant and on course to the target heading.
The sensor fault detection during this scenario is shown in Figure 5.10. The pitot
sensor fault detection is instantaneous for the same reasons as explained in the level
flight scenario. The AoA sensor fault takes time to be detected, as seen in the previous
scenario. However, the AoA has fewer fluctuations than in the previous scenarios. This
is because the AoA is changing during the turn due to the change in speed. The faulty
observations obtained as time increases is closer to the faulty sensor distribution and
further from the normal expected sensor distribution. As time increases the number of
fluctuations reduce. The IMU sensor faults are detected instantaneously and has fewer
fluctuations than the previous scenarios this is expected since the expected accelerations
and rotations during a turn is non-zero. The faulty sensor observations are zero mean
and are closer to the fault distribution and further from the expected distribution for
normal sensor. This increases the fault likelihood (Lˆ(IMU∗) >> Lˆ(IMU)) indicating a
fault.
5.4 Multiple sensor fault detection using parallel UKF
Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1
The previous section implemented a UKF-GPB-1 fault detection method by evaluating
the hypotheses for each sensor sequentially. This section compares the accuracy of the
state-estimate and time taken to update the state-estimate with sensor measurements
when the hypotheses are evaluated in parallel as shown in Figure 5.11. Each hypothesis
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Figure 5.10: Fault likelihood for sensors during turning flight
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Figure 5.11: Flow diagram for UKF-GPB-1 multiple sensor fault detection using parallel hy-
potheses
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Table 5.2: Parallel GPB-1 fault detection hypothesis for n sensors
H(1) H(2) . . . H(2n)
S(1) 0 1 . . . 1
S(2) 0 0 . . . 1
...
...
... . . .
...
S(n) 0 0 . . . 1
Table 5.3: Filter comparison
Filter-1 (Input to Autopilot) Filter-2
Parallel Parallel
Parallel Sequential
Sequential Sequential
Sequential Parallel
consists of a combination of multiple sensors in normal or faulty mode. Given n sensors
there are 2n combinations of hypotheses to be evaluated. Table 5.2 shows the general
form of the permutations for example hypothesis H(2) assumes sensor S(1) is the only
sensor that is faulty.
The simulation is modified to compare the accuracy and time taken to update
the state-estimate using both sequential and parallel implementations. Both imple-
mentations are executed within the same loop as shown in Figure 5.12. The outputs
of Filter-1 and Filter-2 are Xˆ(1)k+1 and Xˆ
(2)
k+1 respectively. The output of Filter-1 is the
state-estimate used for the autopilot. The time taken to update the UKF state-estimate
using the parallel and sequential implementation at each time-step throughout the du-
ration of the simulation is shown in Figure 5.13. The sequential implementation is
approximately 37 times faster than the parallel implementation. This is as expected
since the sequential implementation executes 2n hypotheses where as the parallel im-
plementation executes 2n hypotheses; a significantly larger number of hypotheses than
the sequential implementation.
The accuracy of a state-estimator is determined by evaluating Root-Mean-Square-
Error (RMSE) metric between the true state of the aircraft and the state-estimate
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Figure 5.12: Simulation flow diagram for sequential and parallel GPB-1
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Figure 5.14: RMSE of parallel and sequential implementation of GPB-1 sensor fault detection
obtained from the estimator. In the above scenarios, the true state of the aircraft is
influenced by the estimator since the state-estimate is input to the autopilot and the
autopilot controls the actions of the aircraft that aﬀects the true state of the aircraft.
A comparison of accuracy for both methods requires a common true state. This is done
by executing the combination shown in Table 5.3. Row 1 is compared with row 2 and
row 3 is compared with row 4 since they share the aircraft’s true state information.
Figure 5.14 shows the accuracy of using the parallel UKF-GPB-1 and sequential
UKF-GPB-1 by determining the RMSE between the true state of the aircraft and the
state-estimates generated by the parallel UKF-GPB-1 and the sequential UKF-GPB-1.
RMSE =
√√√√1
k
(∑
X− Xˆ
)2
(5.16)
Prior to conducting this research, the parallel UKF-GPB-1 was expected to outper-
form the sequential UKF-GPB-1 in terms of accuracy. It was anticipated that one of
the combinations of models used in the parallel UKF-GPB-1 would match the true state
and there would be less corruption of the estimates than the sequential UKF-GPB-1.
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Figure 5.15: RMSE of Parallel and Sequential UKF-GPB-1 sensor fault detection for 100
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However, Figure 5.14 shows that this is not the case and the sequential implementation
is more accurate (as well as faster – see Figure 5.13). To understand why this comes
about, it is helpful to note that the error-statistics are deliberately mis-modelled. The
errors associated with a fault (as described in section 5.1) are, in reality and in the
simulation, correlated over time but the correlation is relatively small. The fault mode
in the UKF-GPB-1 filters assumes that the errors associated with a fault are uncor-
related and independent over time but relatively large. Theoretically, a model could
be used to represent every type of faults for estimating the biases present within ev-
ery sensor, but this is not practical to implement since it would require defining every
single fault that could occur to within a sensor which is not feasible. This intentional
mis-modelling has a detrimental eﬀect on the parallel UKF-GPB-1’s accuracy relative
to that of the sequential UKF-GPB-1. This comes about because the sequential UKF-
GPB-1 is better able to interpolate between the faulty and normal models. In contrast,
the parallel UKF-GPB-1 makes a stronger implicit assumption that one of the combi-
nations of sensors is faulty and that those faulty sensors are generating errors that are
independent (over time) and large. This is not the case, since at some instances during
the simulation some of the sensors in the combination is faulty not all of them.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has developed and demonstrated a Multiple Sensor Fault detector using
Unscented Kalman Filter Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 (GPB-1) that evaluates each
sensors hypotheses sequentially. The filter successfully detects multiple sensor faults
during a series of common flight scenarios. The sequential implementation of GPB-1
updates the state-estimate faster and maintains a more accurate state-estimate than
the parallel implementation of GPB-1.
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Chapter 6
Rare Event simulation
Collision Avoidance is an essential safety feature required for Unmanned Aircraft Sys-
tems to operate alongside manned aircraft within non-segregated airspace. The Col-
lision Avoidance capability consists of two functions known as Conflict Detection and
Resolution (CD&R). The Cooperative CD&R scenario assumes that the current state
and future intent is shared between traﬃc and any conflict encountered is resolved
cooperatively. In contrast, non-cooperative scenarios assume that no information is
shared between traﬃc. Instead, such information is deduced or inferred from mea-
surements of the non-cooperative traﬃc obtained from the sensors on-board the UAS.
However, the measurements obtained from sensors are inherently noisy, which give rise
to uncertainties in the observed state and predicted motion of non-cooperative traﬃc.
In an environment where future trajectories are uncertain, the probability of conflict
(Pc) is an essential metric since it serves as an indicator for Conflict Detection in a
non-cooperative environment. The accuracy of the metric is important since the per-
formance of the Resolution stage of the Collision Avoidance system is dependent on the
accuracy of the Conflict Detection stage.
Fortunately, conflicts between air traﬃc are typically low. However, despite the low
probability, the catastrophic outcome of a collision makes it essential to estimate the
probability of conflict accurately. Estimating low probabilities of conflict accurately
using Direct Monte Carlo method requires a large number of samples which leads to
large computational load. A rare event simulation method called Subset Simulation is
explored to be applied to the problem of estimating low probabilities.
Subset Simulation is a Rare Event simulation method that was proposed by Au and
Beck in 2001 [118]. The method calculates the probability of rare events occurring as the
product of the probabilities of less-rare events. Such an approach is less computation-
ally expensive than ‘brute force’ Direct Monte Carlo. The Subset Simulation method
has mostly been used for applications in Civil Engineering discipline. It was initially
used to estimate small probabilities of failure PF in structures due to seismic risk [119].
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Specifically, Reliability sensitivity analysis is a requirement within Civil Engineering
that relies on Monte Carlo methods to address the problem of estimating probabili-
ties where uncertainties exist. Subset Simulation has been applied to the problem of
estimating low failure probability as product of larger probabilities [120, 121]. Com-
posite system reliability has been estimated using Subset Simulation in reference [122].
Bourinet et al. use the Subset Simulation method from the perspective of Support
Vector Machine Classification to estimate the probability associated with structural
reliability [123].
A general outline of the Subset Simulation method is presented in this chapter
and the interested reader is referred to [124] for more details. The Subset Simulation
method uses a combination of the Direct Monte Carlo and the Metropolis Hastings
methods, a description of these methods are presented in sections 6.1 and 6.2 respec-
tively. Section 6.3 describes the Subset Simulation method. The algorithms mentioned
in this chapter are presented in Appendix A.
6.1 Direct Monte Carlo
The Direct Monte Carlo (DMC) method is a sampling method that can be used to
characterise a distribution of interest [125]. The objective of this section is to estimate
the probability of a type of event to occur. Therefore, the DMC method is used as a
‘statistical averaging’ tool, where the probability of failure PF is estimated as the ratio
of failure responses to the total number of trials [124].
A set of N independent identically distributed (i.i.d) inputs {Xn : n = 1, ..., N}
are drawn from the proposal distribution q(X|µ, σ2) of the input parameter space.
The proposal distribution can be any known distribution that can be used to generate
samples. A Normal distribution that is centred at the mean µ and has a variance of
σ2. A set of system responses are observed {Yn = hr(Xn) : n = 1, ..., N}, where hr(...)
is the system process. The occurrence of a failure event F is indicated when a scalar
quantity bF (threshold) is exceeded. The number of samples that exceed the threshold
is YF . Therefore the probability of failure is estimated as PF = P (Y ≥ bF ) = YFN . Such
an approach is suitable for large probabilities (such as P > 0.1) where a small number
of samples can be used to estimate the probability. However for small probabilities
(such as the tail region of the pdf, where P ≤ 10−3) a large number of samples must
be drawn to estimate the probability accurately. This is illustrated by the following
example.
6.1.1 Estimating probability of drawing samples from region F
Figure 6.1 shows a 10× 10 square centred at O = [0, 0]T . The region F is a circle with
radius rc = 1, centred at C = [3,−3]T within this square. The objective is to estimate
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(b) Direct Monte Carlo with 105 samples
Figure 6.1: The probability of drawing samples from the region F is estimated using Direct
Monte Carlo. Figure 6.1(a) estimates the PF = 0 with 100 samples. Figure 6.1(b) estimates
the PF = 1.5× 10−4 with 105 samples.
the probability of drawing samples from this region. The probability distribution of the
overall area is represented by a Gaussian distribution centred at O = [0, 0]T . A set of N
samples {Xn : n = 1, ..., N} are drawn where each sample is a vector; Xn = [xn, yn]T .
The x and y values of each sample are the x-coordinate and y-coordinates of the position
respectively. To clarify, X1 = [x1, x2]T where x1 ∼ N (0, 1) and y1 ∼ N (0, 1). The
distance between the position of each sample and centre of circle C is {Rn = H(Xn, C) :
n = 1, ...N} as defined by Algorithm 5. To clarify, the distance between sample X1
and C is R1 = H(X1, C). Algorithm 6 is used to estimate the probability of drawing
samples from the region F .
Figure 6.1(a) shows 100 samples drawn from the distribution. Note no samples are
drawn from the area F . The probability is estimated PF = 0. The number of samples
are increased to N = 105. Figure 6.1(b) shows some samples are drawn from the region
F and the probability is estimated PF = 1.5× 10−4 This illustrates that Direct Monte
Carlo requires a significantly large number of samples to estimate the probability of
drawing samples from the region F .
This method estimates PF by attempting to realise the entire pdf centred at O that
includes the area F. As the area F reduces the number of samples required to esti-
mate PF increases making such an approach computationally demanding. A diﬀerent
algorithm is needed.
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6.2 Metropolis Hastings
Metropolis-Hastings (MH) is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method used to
characterise a distribution of interest by sampling from a known distribution. This
distribution of interest is known as the target distribution. The MH algorithm origi-
nates from the Metropolis algorithm first used in statistical physics by Metropolis and
co-workers (Metropolis et al, 1953) [126]. Hastings proposed a generalised form of this
algorithm leading to the Metropolis Hastings (MH) algorithm [127].
The MH method generates samples from the proposal distribution q(X|x0, σ2) by
starting from a seed value x0. A chain of n samples is then generated, starting with
x0. The sample xk+1 is generated from the current sample xk using the following
steps [124]:
1. Generate a candidate sample x∗ ∼ q(x∗|xk, σ2).
2. Calculate an acceptance ratio: α = q(xk|x
∗,σ2)f(x∗)
q(x∗|xk,σ2)f(xk)
3. Draw a sample e from a uniform distribution [0,1]
4. Set xk+1 =
 x
∗ if e < α
xk otherwise
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 until n samples have been generated.
The function f(...) defines the target density for the input sample. While, n→∞, this
process is guaranteed to accept samples from q that leads to the realisation of the target
distribution [128]. To help ensure that all regions of the target density are explored,
multiple seeds can be used to generate multiple chains of samples in parallel [124].
6.2.1 Drawing samples from the region F
The Metropolis Hastings method is defined in algorithm 7 and it is applied to the
example of estimating the probability of drawing samples from region F as shown in
the previous section. The covariance of the proposal σ2 is a 2× 2 identity matrix I2×2
and the covariance of the distribution of interest σ2rc = r2c × I2×2 where rc is the radius
of the region F . For this example rc = 1, therefore σ2rc = I2×2.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the chains of samples generated by the Metropolis Hastings
algorithm. This Figure shows 10 samples drawn from the proposal distribution using
the DMC method. These samples are seeds s = {X1, ..., X10}. The MH algorithm is
applied using the seeds s. Each seed generates a chain of 10 samples. Note that many
sample chains do not reach the region F . It is clear that it might be more eﬃcient to
generate more samples for chains with seeds that are closer to the region F since they
have higher likelihood of generating samples that are within the region F or closer to
the region F . Subset Simulation achieves this and is described in the next section.
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Figure 6.2: Drawing samples from the region F using Metropolis Hastings algorithm to generate
chains of conditional samples. The initial samples used as seeds are drawn using Direct Monte
Carlo.
6.3 Subset Simulation
Subset Simulation generates a Complimentary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF)
of the response quantity of interest Y . The probability of failure PF can be directly es-
timated from the CCDF. This CCDF is constructed by generating samples that satisfy
a series of intermediate thresholds b1 > b2 > b3 > ... > bm−1 that divide the space into
m nested regions. These thresholds are defined adaptively as the simulation progresses.
This is described later on in this section. The threshold bm−1 is the required failure
threshold bF (bm−1 = bF ). The intermediate thresholds allow the probability of failure
to be estimated using a classical conditional structure given by
PF = P (Y < bm−1|Y < bm−2)P (Y < bm−2) (6.1)
Samples are generated to satisfy the threshold for each level. The total number of
levelsm is dependent on the magnitude of the target probability PF . Subset Simulation
uses ‘level probability’ p0 ∈ (0, 1) to control how quickly the simulation reaches the
target event of interest [124]. The target probability is used to approximate the number
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Table 6.1: A table of samples, response values and probability intervals generated at various
levels during Subset Simulation.
of levels m required by evaluating PF = (p0)m. To clarify, if the target probability is
PF = 10−5 and p0 = 0.1 then the total number of levels required will be m = 5.
6.3.1 Level 0
Subset Simulation begins at level i = 0 with Direct Monte Carlo (DMC) sampling from
the entire region of interest. A set of N samples {X(0)n : n = 1, ..., N} are drawn from
a proposal distribution q(X(0)n |µ, σ2) (as described in section 6.1). The set of output
responses Y (0)n are evaluated {Y (0)n = hr(X(0)n ) : n = 1, ..., N}. The function hr(...)
defines the system response to the input sample. In the context of SS, the responses
Y
(0)
n are also known as the quantity of interest. The set Y (0)n is sorted in descending
order to create the set {B(0)n : n = 1, ..., N}. The input samples X(0)n are reordered
X˜
(0)
n and correspond to the sorted quantity of interest B(0)n . To clarify, X˜(0)1 is the
input sample that generates the largest output B(0)1 . A CCDF is generated by plotting
B
(0)
n against the probability intervals P (0)n . The probability intervals P (0)n are generated
using the following equation:
P (i)n = pi0
N − n
N
n = 1......N (6.2)
The vector of probability intervals P (0)n is concatenated with the sorted quantity of
interest B(0)n and their respective samples X˜(0)n as illustrated in Table 6.1 by the column
titled ‘Level 0’.
The set of probability intervals P (0)n are plotted against B(0)n to generate the CCDF.
Level 0 makes it possible to accurately approximate CCDF values from 1 − N−1 to
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Table 6.2: The probabilities and response values of samples generated at various levels of sub-
set simulation are concatenated. Note that the seeds used generate samples at each level are
discarded and replaced with there respective conditional samples.
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p0. Typically the region of interest within the pdf is outside this range (since SS is
typically used to realise rare events). To explore probabilities below p0, further levels
of simulation must be conducted.
6.3.2 Level i > 0
The subsequent levels of SS where, i > 0 explore the rarer regions of the probability
distribution. This is achieved by generating multiple chains of conditional samples
using the MH method as discussed in the previous section. The number of chains and
number of samples per chain are Nc and Ns respectively. They are determined as
Nc = p0N (6.3)
Ns = p−10 (6.4)
Each level of subset simulation maintains N samples (N = NcNs). The response values
of conditional samples generated for the current level imust not exceed the intermediate
threshold bi for this level. This threshold is determined by
bi = B(i−1)N−Nc i is the current subset level (6.5)
The intermediate threshold for level i = 1 is b1 = B(0)N−Nc . To clarify the intermediate
threshold is the (N −Nc)th element of the sorted set of response values B(0)n . The set
of seeds s(i)j are used to generate samples for the current level i are samples generated
from the previous level (i− 1) are defined by
s
(i)
j = X˜(i−1)n (6.6)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ Nc, (N −Nc + 1) ≤ n ≤ N and i > 0.
The set of seeds used to generate conditional samples for level i = 1 is s(1) =
{X˜(0)N−Nc+1, ..., X˜
(0)
N }. The N conditional samples X(1)n are generated using the MH
method. The quantities of interest for X(1)n are determined {Y (1)n = hr(X(1)n ) : n =
1, ..., N} and are sorted in the same manner as the previous level B(1)n . The set B(1)n
and respective samples X˜(1)n are concatenated with the probability intervals P (1)n as illus-
trated in Table 6.1 by the column titled ‘Level i’. Note the samples {X˜(0)N−Nc+1, ..., X˜
(0)
N }
shown in the column titled ‘Level 0’ are used as seeds to generate the conditional sam-
ples {X˜(i)1 , ..., X˜(i)N } in column titled ‘Level i’.
This process is continued until the target level of probability (p0)m is reached at
level i = m − 1; as shown by the column titled ‘Level m − 1’. The samples used as
seeds to generate samples for the consecutive level are discarded and replaced with the
generated samples. This is illustrated in Table 6.2. The column of probability intervals
Pn are plotted against the respective quantities of interest Bn to generate a CCDF.
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This method is continued until the target level of probability PF = (p0)m is reached.
By generating and evaluating conditional samples, the output samples tend towards the
target distribution with significantly less trials than are needed when using the DMC
method. The progressive nature of the algorithm can be demonstrated in the example
problem of estimating the probability of drawing samples from the region F .
6.3.3 Estimating Probability of drawing samples from region F
The example of estimating the probability of drawing samples from the region F shown
in the previous sections is used to illustrate the Subset Simulation method (using algo-
rithm 9). The radius of the circle bounding the region F is rc = 1. The SS parameters
used for this example are: p0 = 0.1, N = 100, Ns = 10, Nc = 10, m = 2. Subset
Simulation is typically used to realise rare events (for PF ≤ 10−3 therefore m > 3).
However for the purpose of this example the number of levels is kept low (m = 2).
The simulation begins with level 0 Direct Monte Carlo where a set of N = 100
samples {X(0)n : n = 1, ..., 100} are drawn from a Gaussian distribution centred at
O = [0, 0]T as shown in Figure 6.3(a). The quantity of interest {R(0)n = H(X(0)n , C) :
n = 1, ..., 100} is the distance between each sample X(0)n and the centre of the circle
C = [3,−3]T (this is the equivalent of Y (0)n used previously). This is determined by
process H(...) as defined by algorithm 5. If the condition R(0)n ≤ r(0)c is satisfied then
the nth sample X(0)n is within the region F . This condition is used to determine if a
sample is within the region F . The quantity of interest R(0)n is sorted in descending
order {B(0)n : n = 1, ..., 100}. This is because the samples with the lowest distances
will be closest to the region F and have a higher likelihood of generating conditional
samples closer to or within the region F than other samples as the simulation progresses
to higher levels (i > 0). The input samples X(0)n are reordered X˜(0)n and correspond to
the sorted quantity of interest B(0)n ; to clarify, the distance between the sample X˜(0)1
and C is B(0)1 . The probability intervals P
(0)
n are determined by equation (6.2). The
sorted quantity of interest B(0)n and respective samples X˜(0)n are concatenated with the
probability intervals P (0)n as shown in the column titled ‘Level 0’ in Table 6.3a. The
CCDF shown in Figure 6.3(b) is generated by plotting the probability intervals P (0)n
against B(0)n . This CCDF shows that no samples have a distance less than the radius
rc therefore no samples have been drawn from the region F .
The SS method continues to the next level (i = 1) and generates N conditional
samples using the MH method. The conditional samples {X(1)n : n = 1, ..., 100} are
generated from a set of seeds s(1)j = {X˜(0)91 , ..., X˜(0)100} that correspond to the sorted
distances {B(0)n : n = 91, ..., 100} from the previous level 0. The intermediate threshold
b1 = B(0)90 determined by equation (6.5) is used to ensure the conditional samples
X
(1)
n generated by each seed satisfies the condition R(1)n ≤ b1. The respective sample
distances R(1)n from C are less than or equal to the level 1 threshold b1. This is to enable
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Figure 6.3: Subset Simulation is applied to the problem of estimating the probability of drawing
samples from the region F . Subset Simulation begins with level 0 by drawing N = 100 sam-
ples from a Gaussian distribution centred at O = [0, 0] using the DMC method as shown in
Figure 6.3(a). The quantity of interest is the distance between each sample and C. These are
plotted against probability intervals to generate a CCDF as shown in Figure 6.3(b). No samples
are within the region F . The SS method proceeds to level 1 and conditional samples are gener-
ated using the MH method. The Nc level 0 samples are used to generate the conditional samples
shown in Figure 6.3(c). These conditional samples are drawn progressively closer to the region
F until some samples are drawn from the region F. This is achieved by drawing samples from
intermediate thresholds closer to the boundary of F . The quantity of interest for the samples
are determined and plotted against the probability intervals for the current level. This CCDF is
appended to the previous CCDF by replacing the samples used as seeds from the previous level
as shown in Figure 6.3(d).
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Table 6.3: Samples generated during both levels of Subset Simulation.
a progressive nature of drawing samples that are closer to the region F . The conditional
samples are generated using algorithm 8. This will eventually lead to samples being
drawn from the region F as SS proceeds to higher number of levels in the future. The
level 1 threshold is marked by the dotted arc in Figure 6.3(c). The figure shows chains
of samples that lead to the region F . The distances R(1)n of samples X(1)n generated in
level 1 are sorted in descending order {B(1)n : n = 1, ..., 100}. The input samplesX(1)n are
reordered X˜(1)n and correspond to the sorted distances B(1)n . The probability intervals
P
(1)
n are generated using equation (6.2) and concatenated with the sorted distances B(1)n
and their corresponding samples X˜(1)n . Table 6.3a illustrates the conditional samples
generated in level 1 using samples from level 0. The seeds used to generate samples
in level 1 are discarded and replaced with the generated level 1 samples as illustrated
in Table 6.3b. Note the probability intervals {P (0)n : n = 91, ..., 100}, sorted distances
{B(1)n : n = 91, ..., 100} and the corresponding input samples {X˜(1)n : n = 91, ..., 100}
from level 0 that were used as seeds to generate the samples for level 1 are discarded and
replaced with level 1 samples X˜(1)n and their respective distances B(1)n and probability
intervals P (1)n . This process is repeated until the maximum number of levels m is
reached. This is when i = m−1. Figure 6.3(d) shows the overall CCDF at level 1. The
overall CCDF is used to estimate the probability of drawing samples from the region
F as approximately PF = 0.02.
This example demonstrates the progressive nature of Subset Simulation when used
to generate conditional samples to realise the rare ‘tail’ region of the pdf. This feature
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of SS results in the empirical observation that SS requires significantly fewer samples
when compared to naive DMC to obtain estimates with the same accuracy. Subset
Simulation is useful for generating samples that progress to the distribution of interest.
6.4 Summary
This chapter has familiarised the reader with the Subset Simulation method and its
utility of estimating low probabilities as a product of larger probabilities. The Direct
Monte Carlo and Metropolis Hastings methods that the Subset Simulation method is
based on, has been explained.
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Chapter 7
Application of Subset Simulation
for Airborne Conflict detection
The estimation of the probability of conflict Pc between air traﬃc is a useful metric
for Conflict Detection & Resolution (CD&R) methods. Such methods can be used in
piloted aircraft but are useful for UAS where an automated method for CD&R will be
required as part of a Sense-and-Avoid system [44].
The safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft System alongside manned aircraft within
non-segregated airspace requires the ability to maintain safe separation between traf-
fic. Although a minimum threshold has not been defined by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), Aviation Authorities and Regulatory Bodies implicitly
understand that a minimum threshold of 500 ft must be maintained in all directions.
A conflict event occurs when two or more aircraft collide or if there is a loss of this
separation between them within a block of airspace. The conflict type depends on the
geometry of the encounter between traﬃc, as defined in reference [20] (mentioned in
chapter 2). If a conflict is detected, the conflict type needs to be identified so that
the appropriate resolution manoeuvre can be executed by the CD&R system to resolve
the conflict. This chapter addresses a key component of a detection of a conflict by
estimating the probability of conflict Pc using Subset Simulation.
This chapter begins by defining the test scenarios used to estimate the Pc between
air traﬃc using the Subset Simulation method in section 7.1. Section 7.2 defines the ap-
plication of Subset Simulation for estimating the probability of conflict between traﬃc.
Section 7.3 estimate the probability of conflict between traﬃc during a series of con-
flicting and potentially conflicting scenarios using Subset Simulation and Direct Monte
Carlo methods. Section 7.4 compares the accuracy and eﬃciency of estimating low
probabilities of conflict Pc using Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo method.
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Figure 7.1: The potentially conflicting scenarios based on the diﬀerent conflicts shown in Fig-
ure 2.1
7.1 Test scenarios
A non-cooperative scenario is assumed, where the traﬃc does not share information.
This is a challenging situation since the information related to the state and intentions
of the traﬃc might be unknown or incorrect. The only information available regarding
the state of traﬃc is from measurements or inference using sensors. In such a scenario,
CD&R system must allow for the possibility that the non-cooperative traﬃc may take
inappropriate actions or may not adhere to the Rules of the Air. This type of situation
requires a UAS to react and take appropriate action to ensure safe separation. To
achieve this the Pc needs to be continuously evaluated against the behaviour of the
observed traﬃc so that the likelihood of the traﬃc causing a conflict can be calcu-
lated. Figure 7.1 illustrates some potentially conflicting scenarios based on Figure 2.1.
During some phases of the scenario, the expected Pc can be very low; such as a mag-
nitude of 10−8 (this is demonstrated later in this section). The previous sections have
demonstrated that estimating low probabilities using the Direct Monte Carlo method is
ineﬃcient and this motivates the use of Subset Simulation (SS). Assessing the full pdf
may not be feasible and may not be required. Subset Simulation provides an eﬃcient
method of determining the probability associated with all predicted conflicts thereby
estimating Pc. In applying SS to this problem, Pc plays the role of the threshold of
failure PF .
The Subset Simulation method is used to estimate the probability of conflict Pc dur-
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ing the simulation of the potentially conflicting scenarios of the Observer and Intruder
aircraft in the Head-on and Overtaking situations as shown in figures 7.1(a) and 7.1(b)
respectively. Both scenarios show the Observer and Intruder in a non-conflicting a state,
where the Intruder is not within the Observer’s protected zone. The Observer’s pro-
tected zone is marked as a circle around the Observer with radius rt = 152.4m (500ft).
Although the current state is non-conflicting there is a potential for future conflict.
For example from the Observer’s perspective the Intruder could continue on its course
or turn right or turn left. The latter could cause a loss of separation or worse – a
collision between the Observer and the Intruder. Also in the situation when the lateral
separation La between the Observer and Intruder is lower than or equal to the radius
of the Observer’s protected zone rt; (rt ≤ La) a conflict occurs due to loss of separation
or collision between the Observer and the Intruder. Therefore, the likelihood of such
conflict needs to be realised by estimating Pc.
The Subset Simulation method is used by the Observer to determine the probability
of conflict Pc between itself and the approaching Intruder for the potentially conflicting
scenarios shown in Figure 7.1. However, since some parameters are not available this
requires the method to be adapted. The order of magnitude for the target probability
(conflict) region (p0)m is unknown. The solution to this problem is addressed later
in this section. Therefore the number of subset levels m required to reach the target
probability level with a fixed p0 is unknown. The Intruder and Observer are simu-
lated as nearly constant acceleration point models [129]. This is a simple model that is
used to illustrate the use of Subset Simulation. It can be augmented by more complex
dynamic models such as Six-Degrees-of-Freedom (SixDoF) aircraft model presented in
chapter 3. This would not aﬀect the use of Subset Simulation and the computational
advantages that it provides. The dynamics of the Intruder and Observer are modelled
in state space form as U(K + 1) = AU(K) and O(K + 1) = AO(K) respectively in
two-dimensional Cartesian space, where K is the time–step index. The Intruder and
Observer statevectors are U(K) = [x, u, ax, y, v, ay]T and O(K) = [x, u, ax, y, v, ay]T
respectively. The displacement, velocity and acceleration in the x-direction are repre-
sented by x, u and ax respectively. The displacement, velocity and acceleration in the
y direction are represented by y, v and ay respectively. The state transition matrix A
is defined
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A =

1 ∆T 12∆T 2 0 0 0
0 1 ∆T 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 ∆T 12∆T 2
0 0 0 0 1 ∆T
0 0 0 0 0 1

(7.1)
where ∆T is the period of discretized time-step. The sampling frequency f = 1∆T .
The Observer estimates the state of the Intruder Uˆ(K) using a Kalman Filter [93].
The periodic measurements of the Intruder’s position Z = [x, y] is defined by the
measurement equation as
Z = HU(K) + [wx, wy]′ (7.2)
where H is the measurement matrix.
H =
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
 (7.3)
wx ∼ N (0, σx) (7.4)
wy ∼ N (0, σy) (7.5)
The periodic position measurements are simulated by adding noise as wx and wy to
the x and y directions respectively. The standard deviation of the of the measurement
error in the x and y directions are σx and σy respectively. For the sake of simplicity the
measurement noise is uncorrelated. The instantaneous state-estimate of the Intruder
is determined using a Kalman Filter. The Intruder’s state-estimate Uˆ(K + 1) and
covariance Sˆ(K + 1) is predicted using equations
Uˆ(K + 1) = AUˆ(K) (7.6)
Sˆ(K + 1) = ASˆ(K)AT +Q (7.7)
The process noise covariance is Q. This is the white-noise jerk version of the Wiener-
Process Acceleration model [129].
Q =
Qσ σ
2
ax
∆T 0
0 Qσ
σ2ay
∆T
 (7.8)
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Qσ =

1
20∆T 5
1
8∆T 4
1
6∆T 3
1
8∆T 4
1
3∆T 3
1
2∆T 2
1
6∆T 3
1
2∆T 2 ∆T
 (7.9)
The parameters σ2ax and σ2ay are the variance of acceleration parameters in the x and
y directions respectively. The Kalman gain G is evaluated during the update stage:
G = Sˆ(K + 1)HT ([HSˆ(K + 1)HT ] +R)−1 (7.10)
where R is the measurement covariance.
R =
σ2x 0
0 σ2y
 (7.11)
This is followed by updating the Intruder estimate Uˆ(K + 1) and error covariance
Sˆ(K + 1) respectively.
Uˆ(K + 1) = Uˆ(K + 1) +G{Z(K)− [HUˆ(K + 1)]} (7.12)
Sˆ(K + 1) = [I −GH]Sˆ(K + 1) (7.13)
7.2 Estimating Probability of Conflict using Subset Sim-
ulation
The Subset Simulation method is applied to the Head-on pass scenario with lateral
separation La = 1000m and longitudinal separation Lo = 2000m. The duration
of the simulation t = 20s with sampling frequency f = 20Hz and the measure-
ment frequency fM = 2Hz. The initial conditions of the Intruder and Observer are
O(0) = [0, 77.2ms−1, 0, 0, 0, 0]T and U(0) = [2000m,−77.2ms−1, 0, 1000m, 0, 0]T . The
Observer’s protected zone radius rt = 152.4m.
Kalman Filter parameters:
• σx = 0.1m
• σy = 0.1m
• σ2ax = 0.01m2s−4
• σ2ay = 0.01m2s−4
Subset Simulation parameters:
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Figure 7.2: Head-on pass scenario with 1000m Lateral Separation
• N = 100
• p0 = 0.1
• Nc = 10
• Ns = 10
• m = 7
Ideally the SS method should continue to higher levels of simulation until conflicting
samples are encountered and Pc can be estimated using the CCDF. This is assuming
infinite simulation resources are available. This is impractical for implementation since
simulation capacity is limited due to limited resources available. Therefore the SS
method implemented requires a limited number of levels1 to be defined m.
Subset Simulation estimates Pc(K +1) where K +1 is the time-step of an instance
during the simulation as shown in Figure 7.2. Subset Simulation begins with level 0
Direct Monte Carlo sampling. A set of 100 samples {U (0)n : n = 1, ..., 100} representing
1An alternative implementation: During the process of SS estimating the Pc; the SS method con-
tinues to higher levels until conflicting samples are found. If new information is received (such as a
new Intruder measurement that updates the Intruder state-estimate) and the SS method has not found
conflicting samples, then the calculation for the current time-step should be abandoned and restarted
with the new information. Restarting is necessary since the information used to calculate Pc becomes
obsolete once more recent information is obtained. This approach would be useful for situations where
real-time computation is enforced. Note that this chapter does not enforce constraints associated with
real-time computation.
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the Intruder’s pdf are drawn from the distribution that is centred at the Intruder’s
mean Uˆ(K +1) and covariance Sˆ(K +1). The mean and covariance are obtained from
the Kalman filter defined in algorithm 13.
The set of samples U (0)n and the intended vector of the Observer O(K) are prop-
agated to generate trajectories J (0)Un and JO respectively. A trajectory J is a set of
consecutive state vectors indexed by the time-step k where k = 1, ..., tf = 1, ..., 400
and f = 20Hz is the sampling frequency (as defined in algorithm 10). For example
the Observer trajectory JO = [O(1), ..., O(tf)] = [O(1), ..., O(400)], where O(1) is the
state vector of the Observer at time-step k = 1. The propagation time t = 20s. This
is also the period of the simulation. Figure 7.3(a) shows the Intruder samples and the
respective trajectories generated with the projected position of the Observer during
level 0 for a Head-on pass scenario with lateral separation La = 1000m. No conflicting
samples have been encountered yet. A conflicting sample is an Intruder sample U (i)n
generated in level i with a trajectory J (i)n that has a miss-distance r(i)n between the
Observer trajectory JO and satisfies the conflict condition r(i)n ≤ rt. The number of
conflicting samples encountered in a level is D.
The quantities of interest are the miss-distances {r(0)n : n = 1, ..., 100}. These are the
minimum distances between the Intruder samples’ trajectories {J (0)Un : n = 1, ..., 100}
and the Observer trajectory JO. Algorithm 11 defines the procedure to determine the
miss-distances between the Observer and Intruder trajectories. A conflict is projected
to occur when there is a loss of minimum separation between any sample in set JUn and
the Observer trajectory JO at any instance. The set of miss-distances r(0)n are sorted
in descending order {B(0)n : n = 1, ..., 100}. The input samples U (0)n are reordered U˜ (0)n
to correspond to the sorted miss-distances B(0)n . To clarify, the sample U˜ (0)1 produces
a trajectory JU˜1 that has the largest miss-distance B
(0)
1 between itself the trajectory
produced by the Observer JO. The samples with lower miss-distances in the current
level have a higher likelihood of generating conditional samples that satisfy the conflict
condition than other samples in the current level. The vector of probability intervals
P
(0)
n are generated by
P
(i)
n+1 = pi0
N − n
N
n = 0, ..., (N − 1) (7.14)
Note that the range of n in this equation is diﬀerent to equation 6.2. This is due to
the maximum number of levels limit m. In the event that SS reaches the maximum
number of levels without encountering conflicting samples the probability of conflict will
be estimated Pc = P (m−1)N = P
(m−1)
100 = 0 (the last probability interval in the P
(m−1)
n
vector that is generated by equation 6.2) and this does not reflect the low magnitude of
the probability. In contrast, the probability interval generated by equation 7.14 allows
the probability of conflict to be estimated Pc < P (m−1)100 ; P
(m−1)
100 = 1 × 10−8. This
information means that although no conflicting samples have been encountered despite
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exhausting all levels of SS the expected Pc is estimated to be lower than (p0)m, the
lowest probability level realisable due to the maximum number of levels limit reached by
SS. Such information is more useful than the estimate Pc = 0 evaluated by equation 6.2.
The level 0 CCDF is constructed by plotting the probabilities P (0)n against B(0)n as shown
in Figure 7.3(c). No conflicting samples have been drawn in level 0 since no miss-
distances satisfy the conflict condition. If the number of conflicting samples D > Nc
then the probability of conflict is estimated Pc = P (i)(N−D+1). This also applies for the
situation where the maximum number of levels has been reached (i = m− 1) and some
conflicts have been encountered where the number of conflicts encountered is less than
or equal to Nc; (Nc ≥ D > 0). The DMC method estimates the probability of conflict
Pc = DN as defined by algorithm 12.
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Figure 7.3: These figures illustrate the application of SS to estimate the Pc(K + 1) at the
time-step K + 1 during a Head-on pass between an Observer O(K) and Intruder U(K) with
lateral separation of 1000m. SS begins with level 0 (DMC) where N = 100 samples are drawn
from a distribution centred at the Intruder’s state-estimate Uˆ(K + 1) with a covariance of
Sˆ(K+1) obtained from the Kalman Filter. Figure 7.3(a) shows trajectories generated by level 0
samples, no conflicting samples have been encountered. The simulation proceeds to level 1 where
conditional samples are generated using Nc samples from level 0 as seeds. The trajectories of
the level 0 samples used as seeds are highlighted in Figure 7.3(a). The MH method is applied
to generate conditional samples from the seeds. The trajectories of generated samples for level
1 are shown in Figure 7.3(b). This process is continued to generates more trajectories as the
number of levels increase. The method continues until conflicting samples are encountered at
higher levels as shown in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: The above figures show trajectories of conditional samples generated as the simu-
lation continues to higher levels. Subset Simulation continues until the number of conflicting
samples D found in a level is greater than Nc within a level as shown in Figure 7.4(b). The
probability of conflict is estimated as Pc(K + 1) = 0.52× 10−4 as shown in Figure 7.4(d).
However if the condition D > Nc is not satisfied and i < m − 1; SS proceeds to
the next level (i > 0) and continues until the condition is satisfied or if the maximum
number of levels is reached. This is because the conflict region of the pdf is not repre-
sented accurately enough due to the lack of suﬃcient samples representing the conflict
region in the current level. Therefore it is necessary generate more conditional samples
at higher levels of SS to progress towards representing the conflict region of the pdf
more accurately.
The following subset levels (i > 0) generate N conditional Intruder samples U˜ (i)n
using the Metropolis Hastings method as defined in algorithm 14. The set of seeds s(i)j
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required to generate the samples are selected from samples in the previous level using
s
(i)
j = U˜ (i−1)n (7.15)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ Nc, (N −Nc + 1) ≤ n ≤ N and i > 0.
Figure 7.3(a) highlights the trajectories of level 0 samples selected as seeds to gener-
ate level 1 conditional samples. Figure 7.3(b) shows the trajectories of the conditional
samples generated in level 1. The set s(i)j contains Nc seeds; one for each chain. Each
chain generates Ns samples. This maintains the total number of samples as N for each
level. The MH method uses an indicator d (as shown in algorithm 14) to ensure the
miss-distance r(i)∗ between the Observer’s trajectory JO and Intruder trajectory J (i)∗ of
the proposed sample U (i)∗ is less than the intermediate threshold bi set by equation 6.5.
If r(i)∗ > bi then the proposed sample is rejected and the current sample of the Intruder
is maintained.
The miss-distances {r(1)n : n = 1, ..., 100} of the conditional samples U (1)n generated
in level 1 are determined and sorted in descending order B(1)n using the same method
as level 0. The input samples U (1)n are reordered U˜ (1)n to correspond to the sorted miss-
distances B(1)n . The probability intervals P (1)n for the current level are generated and
plotted against B(1)n to construct a CCDF. Figure 7.3(d) shows the CCDF generated
up to level 1. Note the miss-distances of the samples used as seeds from the previous
level 0 (that are highlighted in Figure 7.3(c)) are discarded and replaced with the
miss-distances of the conditional samples generated in level 1. This illustrates that
the samples used as seeds are discarded and replaced with the conditional samples
generated in the current level. This process is repeated as SS progresses to higher levels
until the condition D > Nc is satisfied or the maximum number of levels is reached as
defined in algorithm 15. Figure 7.4(a) shows the trajectories of the conflicting samples
encountered in level 3. However the condition D > Nc had not been satisfied. This
required SS to proceed to level 4 and generate conditional samples that satisfy the
condition D > Nc as shown in Figure 7.4(b). The CCDF generated up to level 4 is
shown in Figure 7.4(c). The CCDF is used to estimate the Pc(K + 1) = 0.52 × 10−4
as shown in Figure 7.4(d). This process is repeated through out the duration of the
simulation to determine the probability of conflict for each time-step using samples
from the prediction of the Intruder’s estimate Uˆ(K + 1) and covariance Sˆ(K + 1).
7.3 Results
The Subset Simulation method has been tested and compared with the Direct Monte
Carlo (DMC) method to estimate the probability of conflict Pc between the Observer
and Intruder by simulating the scenarios shown in Figure 7.1. The Observer and
Intruder were modelled as points with nearly constant velocity in a geometric configu-
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ration based on the three diﬀerent types of conflict shown in Figure 2.1. The Pc metric
was estimated as an average of 50 Monte Carlo simulation during the Head-on and
Overtaking conflicts as shown in figures 7.1(a) and 7.1(b) respectively. The tests were
repeated with varying lateral separations La = {0, 100, 152, 500, 1000, 1100}m.
The following Subset Simulation parameters were used for all scenarios: N = 100;
Level probability: p0 = 0.1; Nc = p0N = 10; Ns = 1p0 = 10; m = 7; Observer mini-
mum separation threshold rt = 500ft = 152.4m. Algorithm 16 defines the simulation
conducted.
The number of samples used for each level of SS remain constant. However the
number of levels required at a given time-step vary depending on the magnitude of
Pc. Therefore the total number of samples NT required to realise a conflict at a given
time-step varies as a function of time-step. In the interest of a fair comparison of
the computational eﬀort between the two methods, an equal number of samples are
evaluated for both methods. The estimation using DMC is conducted with NT samples,
where NT is the number of samples that are used in the SS method at the same time-
step. To clarify, if the SS method reaches level i = 4 to satisfy the conflict condition
for estimating the P (SS)c (K) at time-step K, then NT = 100 × 5 = 500 samples have
been used by the SS method. Therefore DMC estimates the P (DMC)c (K) for the same
time-step with 500 samples only.
7.3.1 Estimation of Pc for Head-on Pass scenario
The Intruder and Observer parameters used for the Head-on pass scenario are as follows:
The Intruder and Observer maintain a constant speed of 150 knots (77.17ms−1). The
Observer maintains a constant heading of 0◦; the Intruder maintains a constant heading
of 180◦. The Observer’s minimum separation threshold is rt = 500ft = 152.4m. The
Longitudinal separation is Lo = 2000m
Figures 7.5(a), 7.5(b) and 7.5(c) show the estimation of Pc for the Head-on pass
scenario using SS and DMC methods with lateral separations of 0m, 100m and 152m
respectively. The scenarios are conflicting because the geometric configuration and
initial conditions of both the Observer and Intruder are conflicting and remain as such
throughout the duration of the simulation. When t ≤ 12s the Intruder and Observer
are approaching each other the estimated Pc increases. This is as expected because
a conflict is imminent. Both estimation methods show approximately the same Pc as
expected, since the first level of the SS method is DMC sampling. At this stage the
conflict region of the pdf is large and the probability of drawing a sample which leads
to a conflict is high. The conflict occurs at t ≈ 12.5s due to the loss of separation
between the Observer and Intruder. Figure 7.5(c) shows the estimation of Pc with
lateral separation La = 152.4m = rt. This is a conflicting scenario since the Intruder
skims Observer’s protected boundary at t ≈ 12.5s as the Observer and Intruder pass
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Figure 7.5: The estimated Pc using the Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo meth-
ods during the Head-on pass as shown in Figure 7.1a with varying lateral separation La =
{0, 100, 152, 500, 1000, 1100}m.
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Figure 7.6: SS and DMC trajectories for Head-on pass with lateral separation 1000m
each other. The oscillations during t ≤ 12s are due to La = rt. This is a borderline
situation.
The Intruder and Observer pass each other at t ≈ 13s. The Pc estimated by both
methods is still 1 until t > 14s where the Intruder has exited the Observer’s protected
zone. At this stage the Observer and Intruder have receding relative velocities and are
moving away from each other. Pc is expected to reduce at this stage as shown in the
log-y plot. The conflict region of the pdf reduces since both Intruder and Observer
are moving away from each other. The SS method estimates the Pc as being close to
zero at an order of magnitude of 10−7. The lowest probability which can be realised is
Pc = 10−8. This is due to a maximum level restriction imposed in the simulation. In
such instances the probability of conflict can be considered to be less than the order
of 10−8. At this stage the DMC method draws the same number of samples as SS
but is unable to find conflicting samples and estimates Pc = 0. This is because the
region of conflict within the pdf has reduced and the probability of drawing a conflicting
sample is rare. This requires the DMC method to draw and evaluate a larger number
of samples at this stage before a conflicting sample is drawn from the rare region of
conflict within the pdf. The SS method is able to obtain the conflicting samples from
the rare region of the pdf by generating samples conditionally in such a way that the
samples satisfy the intermediate thresholds leading to the rare region using the MH
method. Each subset level corresponds to an intermediate threshold. This progressive
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feature of the SS method allows a more eﬃcient approach to reach the rare ‘tail’ region
of the pdf.
As the lateral separation of the scenario is increased, the expected Pc decreases. The
scenario is simulated with a lateral separation of 500m, 1000m and 1100m as shown in
figures 7.5(d), 7.5(e) and 7.5(f) respectively. These are non-conflicting scenarios. The
figures show abrupt variations in Pc. These are caused by the Monte Carlo nature of
our algorithm. Note that, since the sampling frequency is high relative to the thickness
of the line in the figure, the variations in Pc are particularly readily perceived. The
conflict region of the pdf is smaller than the previous scenarios. The SS estimation
method is able to estimate low Pc throughout the duration of the simulation, whereas
with an equivalent number of samples the DMC method is unable to find conflicting or
near conflicting samples of the Intruder in most instances. Figure 7.5(d) shows abrupt
variations in the Pc estimated by the DMC method when t < 1s where the estimate
tends to zero. These are instances where the DMC method is unable for find any
conflicting samples and estimates Pc = 0.
Figures 7.6(a) and 7.6(b) show the trajectories of the samples evaluated by SS and
DMC methods at an instance before and after the Intruder and Observer pass each
other respectively. The progressive nature of the SS method can be observed as a
concentration of trajectories leading to the conflict trajectory. In contrast the DMC
method has drawn the same number of samples (most are overlapping) without realising
any conflicts.
7.3.2 Estimation of Pc for Intruder Overtaking Observer
The scenario parameters used are as follows: The Intruder speed is 300knots = 154.3ms−1
and the Observer speed is 150knots = 77.17ms−1. Both Intruder and Observer main-
tain a constant heading of a constant heading of 180◦. The longitudinal distance Lo
between the Intruder and Observer is Lo = 1000m.
Both SS and DMC methods have been applied to the Overtaking scenario as shown
in Figure 7.1(b). Similar to the previous scenario, the SS method is able to obtain
samples from the rare conflicting region of the pdf consistently throughout the duration
of the simulation for this scenario. As the lateral separation increases, the Pc decreases
(as expected). Figures 7.7(e) and 7.7(f) show the Pc when the lateral separation is
1000m and 1100m respectively. The change in Pc is less abrupt compared to the 100m
lateral separation after the Intruder as passed the Observer when t > 13s. The Pc is
approximately the same throughout the duration of the simulation. This is because the
increased lateral separation includes samples with low turn rates in the conflict category
and these are common enough to be drawn by the DMC method and SS method. With
low lateral separation the conflicting samples will need high turn rates. These are rare
and are realised by using SS method. In contrast the DMC method is unable to realise
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ing Observer conflict with 0m
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ing Observer conflict with 100m
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(c) Pc during Intruder overtak-
ing Observer conflict with 152m
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(e) Pc during Intruder overtak-
ing Observer with 1000m Lateral
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Figure 7.7: The Pc is estimated using the SS and DMC methods during the Intruder Over-
taking the Observer scenario as shown in Figure 7.1(b) with varying lateral separation La =
{0, 100, 152, 500, 1000, 1100}m.
113
them. Also throughout the simulation, the relative change in angle of the Intruder
from the Observer’s perspective reduces as the lateral separation is increased. The
conflicting samples can have lower turn rates despite the Intruder having passed the
Observer. Such samples are common and can be realised by both methods.
7.4 Accuracy and Eﬃciency of Subset Simulation
A range of magnitudes of probabilities have been evaluated within the simulated sce-
narios shown in the previous section. This section analyses the accuracy and eﬃciency
of using the Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo methods to estimate probabil-
ities at each of a number of orders of magnitude. In order for a fair comparison to be
conducted – a common phase within a simulation scenario must be found where both
methods are able to realise conflicting samples and estimate the probability of conflict.
The first order of magnitude considered for comparison is Pc1 ≈ 10−1. A suitable
phase to conduct the comparison is at t = 1s during the Head-on scenario with lateral
separation La = 152.4 and longitudinal separation Lo = 2000m where a conflict is
inevitable. At this phase p0 ≤ Pc1 < 1 and both methods estimate a similar probability
of conflict. This is as expected since the probability is large enough to generate suﬃcient
conflicting samples in the first level of Subset Simulation and it does not progress to
higher levels of Subset Simulation. The first level of Subset Simulation is Direct Monte
Carlo so the performance is the same.
The second order of magnitude considered is Pc2 . This probability needs to be
lower than Pc1 where Pc2 < p0. Such phases occur frequently in the Head-on pass and
Overtaking scenarios, typically when t > 14s as shown in figures 7.5 and 7.7 respectively.
Note, during such phases the Subset Simulation method is able to obtain conflicting
samples and provide a good estimate for Pc. However, the Direct Monte Carlo method
fails to find conflicting samples and is unable to estimate the probability of conflict
accurately (other than in a trivial case, Pc = 0 that is inaccurate). For example the
Head-on pass scenarios in Figure 7.5 shows abrupt changes in Pc in some cases from a
magnitude of 10−1 to 10−8 at approximately 13s as the Observer and Intruder pass each
other. This change in magnitude of probability is very large and abrupt (steep). The
magnitude 10−8 is very rare. For such probabilities the Subset Simulation method is
able to obtain conflicting samples and estimate the Pc but Direct Monte Carlo method
fails to obtain conflicting samples and results in estimating Pc = 0. The Direct Monte
Carlo method requires a large number of samples to estimate probabilities of such
magnitude (10−8). This might not be practical due to limited simulation resources.
Therefore, this order of magnitude of probability is impractical for comparison since
although the Subset Simulation method is able to find conflicting samples and estimate
the Pc, the Direct Monte Carlo method is unable to find conflicting samples and fails
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Figure 7.8: Head-on pass scenario with 1000m lateral separation and 20km longitudinal sepa-
ration
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Figure 7.9: A comparison of accuracy and eﬃciency between DMC and SS methods for esti-
mating the Pc during the Head-on pass scenario.
to estimate the Pc.
In order to find a phase where Pc2 can be evaluated by both methods the simulation
of the Head-on pass scenario with lateral separation of 1000m was repeated once with
increased longitudinal separation Lo = 20000m for an increased period of t = 200s.
This allowed the change in Pc to occur less abruptly. Figure 7.8 shows Pc estimated by
Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo methods during this scenario. Note, during
the period 80s < t < 120s, there are frequent abrupt variations in the Pc estimated
by the Direct Monte Carlo method as zero. These are phases where the method was
unable to find a conflicting sample and estimated the probability of conflict as zero.
A suitable phase for Pc2 is at t = 100s where the probability of conflict estimated by
Subset Simulation has reduced to approximately 10−2; (Pc2 ≈ 10−2). This satisfies
the p0 > Pc2 criteria. Also, it is the last phase after which the frequency of the Direct
Monte Carlo method finding conflicting samples to estimate the Pc diminishes. In other
words, it is the last phase where both methods are able to generate conflicting samples
to estimate the probability of conflict for a comparison to be conducted.
The accuracy and eﬃciency are compared by calculating the coeﬃcient of variance
(c.o.v.) δ = σµ for estimating the probabilities of conflict Pc1 and Pc2 using both Subset
Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo methods for varying samples sizes N . The mean µ
and standard deviation σ is calculated over 50 Monte Carlo runs. The sample intervals
for Direct Monte Carlo are Ndmc = {102, 103, 104, 105, 106} and the sample intervals
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for Subset Simulation are NSS = {100n : n = 1, ..., 100}. Note, that NSS is the number
of samples at each level of Subset Simulation. The total number of levels can vary for
each Monte Carlo run of Subset Simulation. This causes a total number of samples
to vary for each Monte Carlo run. To allow a fair comparison an average of the total
number of samples for each Monte Carlo run of Subset Simulation is used.
The c.o.v. for estimating Pc1 using Subset Simulation and Direct Monte Carlo
methods at varying sample sizes N is shown by Figure 7.9(a). Note, both methods
have similar c.o.v. as the average sample size increases. This is expected since the
probability is large enough to be realised in level 0 of Subset Simulation that is Direct
Monte Carlo. In Figure 7.9(b) the c.o.v. of Subset Simulation for the lower probability
of conflict Pc2 becomes significantly lower than the c.o.v. of DMC as the average number
of samples is increased. A point of comparison between both methods can be made
where the number of samples N = 104. Note that the c.o.v for Direct Monte Carlo is
approximately 0.48 and the c.o.v for Subset Simulation is approximately 0.04. Also note
that in order for the DMC method to achieve similar c.o.v as the Subset Simulation
method it must use N = 106 samples. Therefore the Subset Simulation estimates
probabilities of magnitude 10−2 approximately ten times more accurately than the
Direct Monte Carlo method while using a fraction of the samples (approximately 1100)
that are required by the Direct Monte Carlo method to achieve similar levels of accuracy.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the utility of the Subset Simulation method to estimate
the probability of conflict (Pc) between air traﬃc within a block of airspace during
conflicting and potentially conflicting scenarios based on the Rules of the Air defined
by the International Civil Aviation Organization. These scenarios can be used to con-
duct benchmarks for comparing future algorithms. The Subset Simulation method has
demonstrated the ability to seek samples from the rare conflict region of interest in
an eﬀort to estimate the probability of conflict with lower computational eﬀort than
Direct Monte Carlo method. For the equivalent number of samples, the Direct Monte
Carlo method fails to consistently obtain samples from the region of interest within
the probability distribution function. The ability of Subset Simulation to estimate low
probability of conflict (of magnitude 10−2) approximately ten times more accurately
than the Direct Monte Carlo method while using approximately 1100 of the total samples
used by the Direct Monte Carlo method to achieve the same level of accuracy as Sub-
set Simulation. This has been demonstrated at a phase during a potentially conflicting
scenario based on the Rules of the Air. This example situation has demonstrated that
the Subset Simulation method is able to estimate low probabilities more accurately
than Direct Monte Carlo method while using less samples than the Direct Monte Carlo
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method. The Subset Simulation method is more accurate and eﬃcient than the Direct
Monte Carlo method for estimating low probability of conflict between air traﬃc.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis has examined the problem of large computational requirements for safety
related algorithms on-board Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Multiple sensor fault de-
tection and Sense-and-Avoid are such essential safety requirements that generate large
computational load that have been explored in this thesis.
For multiple sensor fault detection, a Generalized Pseudo Bayes-1 (GPB-1) method,
consisting of Unscented Kalman Filters, that represent normal and faulty hypotheses
of aircraft sensors, are used to detect faulty sensors and update the aircraft’s state-
estimate. The hypotheses for each sensor are evaluated sequentially using measure-
ments obtained from the aircraft’s sensors. This method is referred to as the sequential
UKF-GPB-1 and has been tested successfully by simulation. A Six-degrees-of-Freedom
flight model for a Navion aircraft with multiple sensors (three Pitot-static, two Angle-
of-Attack and an Inertial Measurement Unit) and an autopilot has been developed to
simulate common flight scenarios. This is a standard flight model that can be used for
benchmarking purposes to compare future algorithms. The fault detection method has
been tested by simulating multiple sensor faults during common flight scenarios such
as level, climbing, descending and turning flight. The fault detection method success-
fully detected multiple sensor faults during the diﬀerent flight scenarios. The sequential
UKF-GPB-1 is compared against the parallel UKF-GPB-1 where each hypotheses are a
combination of sensor failures. The sequential UKF-GPB-1 updates the aircraft state-
estimate faster and maintains a more accurate state-estimate of the aircraft than the
parallel UKF-GPB-1.
For Sense-And-Avoid, the Subset Simulation method has been used to estimate the
probability of conflict, Pc, between air traﬃc in non-cooperative scenarios. This method
has been tested by simulating a series of conflicting and potentially conflicting scenarios
based on the Rules of the Air defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
These scenarios can be used to conduct benchmarks for comparing future algorithms.
For scenarios with low probabilities of conflict (of magnitude 10−2) the Subset Sim-
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ulation method estimates the Pc to be approximately ten times more accurate than
the Direct Monte Carlo method. The Subset Simulation method achieves this while
using approximately 1100 of the total samples used by the Direct Monte Carlo method
to achieve the same level of accuracy as Subset Simulation.
The eﬃcient and accurate methods for multiple sensor fault detection and estimat-
ing low probabilities of conflict can benefit Sensor Fault Detection and Sense-And-Avoid
systems on-board the UAS respectively. The computational capacity required for such
systems on-board the UAS can be reduced using the algorithms proposed in this thesis
– leading to reduced Size, Weight, Power – and reduced Cost (SWAP-C) of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
8.1 Future Work
The Subset Simulation method is scalable to involve multiple Intruders where the Pc
is estimated for each intruder. This is useful for the resolution stage, where Intruders
can be prioritised based on the respective Pc and an optimised resolution to manoeuvre
is determined to minimise the new Pc after the resolution manoeuvre. A more eﬃ-
cient method of estimating the Pc would be to modify the Subset Simulation method
to use Sequential Monte Carlo Samplers instead of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
method [130]. This will allow the implementation to be parallelised in the seed selec-
tion stage and will give rise to improved statistical eﬃciency.
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Appendix A
Pseudo Code
A.1 Navion
Algorithm 1 Level Flight Condition
1: function NavionLevelFlight(X,Vc,hc)
2: ρ = ρ0
(
1− lhcT0
)( glR−1) ◃ Compute Air density
3: Q = 12ρV 2c
4: CL = mgQS
5: δe =
−Cm0CLα−CmαCL+CmαCL0
Cmδe
CLα−CmαCLδe
6: α = CLCLα −
CL0
CLα
− CLδe δeCLα
7: CD = CD0 + CkC2L
8: T = QSCD cosα
9: return T, δe
10: end function
Algorithm 2 Navion Aircraft simulation
1: function NavionDynamics(∆t, K, I(x,y,z), Xk, ηk)
◃Extract current state elements and constants
2: [Ix, Iy, Iz] = I(x,y,z)
3: [b, c, S, CL0 , CLα , CLβ , CLq , CLδe , CYα , CYβ , CYp , CYrCYδa , CYδe , CYδr , CD0 , Ck,
Clα , Clβ , Clp , Clr , Clr , Clδa , Clδe , Clδr , Cm0 , Cmα , Cmβ , Cmα˙ , Cmq , Cmδe
Cnα , Cnβ , Cnp , Clqq, Clδa , Clδe , Clδr ] = K
4: [x, u, ax, z, w, az, θ, q, q˙, y, v, ay, ψ, p, p˙, ϕ, r, r˙]T = Xk ◃ Current state elements
5: [δa, δe, δr, T ]T = ηk ◃ Current control elements
6: Va =
√
u2 + v2 + w2 ◃ Compute aircraft speed
7: α = tan−1(wu ) ◃ compute angle-of-attack
8: β = sin−1( vVa ) ◃ compute sideslip angle
9: ρ = ρ0
(
1− lzT0
)( glR−1) ◃ Compute Air density
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10: Q = 12ρV 2a ◃ Compute Dynamic pressure
11: α˙ = uw˙−wu˙
u2+w2
◃Compute Force coeﬃcients
12: CL = CL0 + CLαα+ CLββ + c2VaCLqq + CLδe δe
13: CY = CYαα+ CYββ + b2Va (CYpp+ CYrr) + CYδa δa + CYδe δe + CYδr δr
14: CD = CD0 + CkC2L
◃Compute Accelerations
15: u˙ = −Q
(
S
m
)
(CD cosα cosβ+CY cosα sin β−CL sinα)+ Tm − g sin θ− qw+ rv
16: v˙ = −Q
(
S
m
)
(CD sin β − CY cosβ) + g sinϕ cos θ − ru+ pw
17: w˙ = −Q
(
S
m
)
(CD sinα cosβ+CY sinα sin β+CL cosα)+ g cos θ cosϕ−pv+ qu
◃Compute Moment coeﬃcients
18: Cl = Clαα+ Clββ + b2Va (Clpp+ Clrr) + Clδa δa + Clδe δe + Clδr δr
19: Cm = Cm0 + Cmαα+ Cmββ + c2Va (Cmα˙α˙+ Cmqq) + Cmδe δe
20: Cn = Cnαα+ Cnββ + b2Va (Cnpp+ Clqq) + Clδa δa + Clδe δe + Clδr δr
◃Compute angular accelerations
21: p˙ = − 1Ix [qr(Iz − Iy)−QSbCl]
22: q˙ = − 1Iy [rp(Ix − Iz)−QScCm]
23: r˙ = − 1Iz [pq(Iy − Ix)−QSbCn]
24: return u˙, v˙, w˙, p˙, q˙, r˙
25: end function
Algorithm 3 The SixDoF function
1: function NavionSixDoF(∆t, K, I(x,y,z), Xk, ηk)
2: [u˙k+1, v˙k+1, w˙k+1, p˙k+1, q˙k+1, r˙k+1]T = NavionDynamics(∆t, K, I(x,y,z), Xk,
ηk)
3: [∆u,∆v,∆w]T = [u˙k+1, v˙k+1, w˙k+1]T∆t ◃ Integrate acceleration to determine
change in speed
4: [uk+1, vk+1, wk+1]T = [uk, vk, wk]T + [∆u,∆v,∆w]T
◃Rotate to earth oriented axis
5:

x˙k+1
y˙k+1
z˙k+1
 =

cosψk − sinψk 0
sinψk cosψk 0
0 0 1


cos θk 0 sin θk
0 1 0
− sin θk 0 cos θk


1 0 0
0 cosϕk − sinϕk
0 sinϕk cosϕk


uk+1
vk+1
wk+1

6: [∆x,∆y,∆z]T = [x˙k+1, y˙k+1, z˙k+1]T∆t
7: [xk+1, yk+1, zk+1]T = [xk, yk, zk]T + [∆x,∆y,∆z]T
8:

ψ˙
θ˙
ϕ˙
 =

1 sinϕk tan θk cosϕk tan θk
0 cosϕk − sinϕk
0 sinϕk sec θk cosϕk sec θk


pk+1
qk+1
rk+1

9: [∆ψ,∆θ,∆ϕ]T = [ψ˙, θ˙, ϕ˙]T∆t
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10: [ψk+1, θk+1, ϕk+1]T = [ψk, θk, ϕk]T+[∆ψ,∆θ,∆ϕ]T ◃ Determine aircraft attitude
11: [∆p,∆q,∆r] = [p˙, q˙, r˙]T∆t ◃ Integrate angular acceleration to determine change
in angular speed
12: [pk+1, qk+1, rk+1]T = [pk, qk, rk]T + [∆p,∆q,∆r]T ◃ Aircraft angular rates
13: Xk+1 = [xk+1, uk+1, u˙k+1, zk+1, wk+1, w˙k+1, θk+1, qk+1, q˙k+1,
yk+1, vk+1, v˙k+1, ψk+1, pk+1, p˙k+1, ϕk+1, rk+1, r˙k+1]T
14: return Xk+1
15: end function
Algorithm 4 Aircraft Autopilot
1: function AutoPilot(X, ψC , zC)
2: [x, u, ax, z, w, az, θ, q, q˙, y, v, ay, ψ, p, p˙, ϕ, r, r˙]T = Xk ◃ Current state elements
3: ∆z = z − zc
4: αϵ = 1K1∆z
5: δek+1 = δek + sign(αϵ)
min(Kδe |αϵ|,qmax)
qδe
6: Vbody = [u, v, w]T
7: Vˆearth = T eB(ψ, θ, ϕ)Vbody
8: uc = T eB(ψc, 0, 0)u
9: ϕd = sign(∆ψ)min(Kϕ|∆ψ|, ϕmax)
10: δak+1 = δak + sign(∆ϕ)
min(Kδa |ϕd|,pmax)
pδa
11: δrk+1 = δrk + sign(βk)
min(Kδr |βk|,rmax)
rδr
12: return [δak+1 , δek+1 , δrk+1 ]
13: end function
A.2 Direct Monte Carlo
Algorithm 5 Determine distance between samples X and C
1: function h(X,C)
2: V = X − C
3: R =
√
V 2x + V 2y
4: return R
5: end function
Algorithm 6 Direct Monte Carlo
1: function DMC(N , C, rc)
2: D = 0
3: for n = 1 : N do
4: x ∼ N (0, 1)
5: y ∼ N (0, 1)
6: Xn = [x, y]T
7: Rn = H(Xn, C)
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8: if Rn ≤ rc then
9: D = D + 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: PF = DN
13: return PF
14: end function
A.3 Metropolis Hastings
Algorithm 7 Generate conditional chains of samples using Metropolis Hastings
algorithm
1: function MH(s, n, C, rc)
2: σ2rc = r2cI2×2
3: for j = 1 : |s| do ◃ For each seed
4: X0 = sj ◃Select seed sample
5: for k = 0 : n− 1 do
◃Generate Candidate sample X∗
6: g ∼ N (0, 1)
7: X∗ = Xk + g
◃Calculate acceptance ratio
8: β = q(X
∗|Xk,σ2)
q(Xk|X∗,σ2)
p(X∗|C,σ2rc )
p(Xk|C,σ2rc)
9: α = min {1, β}
10: e ∼ [0, 1]
11: X(j)k+1 =
 X
∗ if e < α
Xk if e ≥ α
12: end for
13: end for
14: return X(j)
15: end function
A.4 Subset Simulation
Algorithm 8 Generate conditional chains of samples of Subset Simulation using
Metropolis Hastings algorithm
1: function MH_I(s, n, C, rc)
2: σ2rc = r2cI2×2
3: for j = 1 : |s| do ◃ For each seed
4: X0 = sj ◃Select seed sample
5: for k = 0 : n− 1 do
◃Generate Candidate sample X∗
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6: g ∼ N (0, 1)
7: X∗ = Xk + g
◃Determine distance between X∗ and C
8: R∗ = H(X∗, C)
◃Determine distance between Xk and C
9: Rk = H(Xk, C)
◃Indicator function for range
10: d =
 1 if R
∗ ≤ rc
0 if R∗ > rc
◃Calculate acceptance ratio
11: β = q(X
∗|Xk,σ2)
q(Xk|X∗,σ2)
p(X∗|C,σ2rc )
p(Xk|C,σ2rc)
12: α = min {1, β}
13: e ∼ [0, 1]
14: X(j)k+1 =
 X
∗ if e < α
Xk if e ≥ α
15: R(j)k+1 =
 R
∗ if e < α
Rk if e ≥ α
16: end for
17: end for
18: return X(j), R(j)
19: end function
Algorithm 9 Subset Simulation
1: function SS(C, N , p0, m)
2: Nc = p0N
3: Ns = p−10
4: i = 0 Set current level
◃Direct Monte Carlo: Draw N samples and determine quantity of interest
5: for n = 1 : N do
6: X(i)n ∼ N (0, 1)
◃Quantity of interest: Determine distance between samples X(i)n and C
7: R(i)n = H(X(i)n , C)
8: end for
9: B(i)n ← R(i)n Sort distances in descending order
10: X˜(i)n ← X(i)n Reorder the input samples to correspond to the sorted quantity of
interest B(i)n
◃Generate probability intervals; equation 6.2
11: for n = 1 : N do
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12: P (i)n = pi0N−nN
13: end for
◃CCDF: Concatenate vectors P (i)n , B(i)n and sample X˜(i)n
14: En = [P (i)n , B(i)n , X˜(i)n ]
◃Begin lower levels of subset simulation
15: for i = 1 : m− 1 do
◃Set threshold
16: bi = B(i−1)N−Nc
◃Set seeds using equation 6.6
17: for j = 1 : Nc do
18: n = N −Nc + j
19: s(i)j = X˜
(i−1)
n
20: end for
◃Generate conditional samples using Metropolis Hastings algorithm
21: [X(i)n , R(i)n ] = MH_I(s(i)j , Ns, C, bi)
22: B(i)n ← R(i)n Sort distances in descending order
23: X˜(i)n ← X(i)n Reorder the input samples to correspond to the sorted quantity
of interest B(i)n
◃Generate probability intervals; equation 6.2
24: for n = 1 : N do
25: P (i)n = pi0N−nN
26: end for
◃CCDF: Discard all rows after Ei(N−Nc)
◃Concatenate P (i)n , B(i)n , X˜(i)n and append to E
27: for n = 1 : N do
28: Ei(N−Nc+n) = [P
(i)
n , B
(i)
n , X˜
(i)
n ]
29: end for
30: end for
31: return E
32: end function
A.5 Estimating Probability of Conflict between Air traﬃc
Algorithm 10 Propagate State to generate trajectory
1: function SampleTrajectory(U0, f, t, A)
2: J0 = U0
3: for k = 0 : tf do
4: U(k + 1) = AU(k)
5: J(k + 1) = U(k + 1)
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6: end for
7: return J
8: end function
Algorithm 11 Determine miss-distance r and minimum points Uˆxy, Oxy between
observer trajectory JO and Intruder trajectory JUˆ
1: function MinDistance(JO, JU )
◃Diﬀerence between Observer and Intruder trajectory
2: JOU = JU − JO
◃Distance between each point on trajectories
3: rOU =
√
J2OUx + J
2
OUy
◃Minimum distance
4: rOUmin = min(rOU )
◃Index of minimum distance
5: k = {rOUn |n = rOUmin}
6: JOmin = JOxy(k)
7: JUmin = JUxy(k)
8: return rOUˆmin , JOmin , JUˆmin
9: end function
Algorithm 12 Estimating Probability of Conflict using Direct Monte Carlo
1: function PC_DMC(f, t, A,O, Uˆ , Sˆ, N, rt)
2: D = 0
◃Propagate Observer for t seconds
3: JO = SampleTrajectory(O, f , t, A)
4: for n = 1 : N do
◃Draw sample
5: Un ∼ N (Uˆ , Sˆ)
◃Propagate Intruder Samples for t seconds
6: Jn = SampleTrajectory(Un, f, t, A)
◃Determine miss-distance between Observer and Sample Trajectories
7: rn = MinDistance(JO, Jn)
8: if rn ≤ rs then
9: D = D + 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: Pc = DN
13: return Pc, D, Un, JO, Jn, rn
14: end function
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Algorithm 13 Kalman Filter
1: function KF(Uˆ(K), Sˆ(K), Z, H, Q, R, MZ)
◃Predict
2: Uˆ(K + 1) = AUˆ(K)
3: Sˆ(K + 1) = ASˆ(K)AT +Q
◃Update if new measurement is available
4: if MZ = true then
5: G = Sˆ(K + 1)HT {[HSˆ(K + 1)HT ] +R}−1
6: Uˆ(K + 1) = Uˆ(K + 1) +G{Z − [HUˆ(K + 1)]}
7: Sˆ(K + 1) = [I −GH]Sˆ(K + 1)
8: end if
9: return Uˆ(K + 1), Sˆ(K + 1)
10: end function
Algorithm 14 Generate conditional samples using Metropolis Hastings
1: function MH_ConflictSamples(f , t, A, O, Uˆ , Sˆ, sj , Ns, rt)
2: σ2rt = r2t I2×2
3: JO = SampleTrajectory(O, f, t, A)
4: for j = 1 : Nc do
5: U0 = sj ◃Select seed sample
◃For each seed generate Ns samples
6: for k = 0 : Ns − 1 do
◃Draw acceleration sample from mean
7: a∗x ∼ N (0, 1)
8: a∗y ∼ N (0, 1)
9: g = [0, 0, a∗x, 0, 0, a∗y]T
◃Generate Candidate sample U∗
10: U∗ = Uk + g
◃Propagate Samples for t seconds
11: J∗U = SampleTrajectory(U∗, f, t, A)
12: JUk = SampleTrajectory(Uk, f, t, A)
◃Determine minimum miss-distance and (x, y) coordinates of minimum
points between Observer and Sample Trajectories
13: [rk, JOmin , JUkmin ] = MinDistance(JO, JUk)
14: [r∗, J∗Omin , J
∗
Umin ] = MinDistance(JO, J
∗
U )
◃Indicator function for miss-distance
15: d =
 1 if r
∗ < rt
0 if r∗ ≥ rt
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◃Calculate acceptance ratio
16: β =
p(J∗
Uˆmin
|J∗Omin ,σ
2
rt
)q(U∗|Uˆ ,Sˆ)
p(JUkmin |JOmin ,σ
2
rt
)q(Uk|Uˆ ,Sˆ)d
17: α = min {1, β}
18: e ∼ [0, 1]
◃Accept candidate sample, trajectory and miss-distance if e < a
19: U (j)k+1 =
 U
∗ if e < α
Uk if e ≥ α
20: J (j)k+1 =
 J
∗ if e < α
Jk if e ≥ α
21: r(j)k+1 =
 r
∗ if e < α
rk if e ≥ α
22: end for
23: end for
24: return U (j), J (j), r(j)
25: end function
Algorithm 15 Estimate Probability of Conflict Using Subset Simulation
1: function PC_SS(f , t, A, O, Uˆ , Sˆ, N , rt, p0, m)
2: Nc = p0N
3: Ns = p−10
4: i = 0 ◃Set current level
◃Direct Monte Carlo
5: [D,U (i)n , r(i)n ] = PC_DMC(f, t, A,O, Uˆ , Sˆ, N, rt)
6: B(i)n ← r(i)n Sort distances in descending order
7: U˜ (i)n ← U (i)n Reorder the input samples to correspond to the sorted quantity of
interest B(i)n
◃Generate probability intervals; equation 7.14
8: for n = 0 : N − 1 do
9: P (i)n+1 = pi0N−nN
10: end for
◃CCDF: Concatenate vectors P (i)n , B(i)n and samples U˜ (i)n
11: En = [P (i)n , B(i)n , U˜ (i)n ]
12: while D < Nc and i < m do
13: i = i+ 1
14: bi = B(i−1)N−Nc ◃Set threshold
◃Set seeds using equation 6.6
15: for j = 1 : Nc do
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16: n = N −Nc + j
17: s(i)j = U˜
(i−1)
n
18: end for
◃Metropolis Hastings to obtain conflicting samples
19: [U (i)n , r(i)n ] = MH_ConflictSamples(f , t, A, O, Uˆ , Sˆ, sj , Ns, bi)
20: B(i)n ← r(i)n Sort distances in descending order
21: U˜ (i)n ← U (i)n Reorder the input samples to correspond to the sorted quantity
of interest B(i)n
◃Generate probability intervals; equation 7.14
22: for n = 0 : N − 1 do
23: P (i)n+1 = pi0N−nN
24: end for
◃CCDF: Discard all rows after Ei(N−Nc)
◃Concatenate P (i)n , B(i)n , U˜ (i)n and append to E
25: for n = 1 : N do
26: Ei(N−Nc+n) = [P
(i)
n , B
(i)
n , U˜
(i)
n ]
27: end for
28: D = |B(i)n ≤ rt| ◃Number of conflicts D
29: end while
30: if D > 0 then
31: Pc = P (i)(N−D+1)
32: else
33: Pc = P (i)N ◃No conflicting samples were found select lowest probability inter-
val
34: end if
35: return Pc, E
36: end function
Algorithm 16 Determine Probability of Conflict using SS and DMC
1: O(0) ◃Initialise Observer
2: U(0) ◃Initialise Intruder
3: Uˆ(0) ◃Initialise Intruder Estimate
4: Sˆ(0) ◃Initialise Intruder Covariance
5: Mc = 0 ◃Measurement counter
6: for K = 0 : tf do
7: O(K + 1) = AO(K) ◃Propagate Observer
8: U(K + 1) = AU(K) ◃Propagate Intruder
9: MZ = false ◃Flag to indicate new measurement
10: if Mc = ffM then ◃Conduct Intruder position measurement
11: Z = HU(K + 1) + [wx, wy]T
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12: MZ = true ◃Set flag to indicate that new measurement is available for
Kalman filter Update
13: Mc = 0 ◃ Reset measurement counter
14: end if
15: Mc = Mc + 1 ◃Increment measurement counter
◃Predict/Update estimate of Intruder with Kalman filter
16: [Uˆ(K + 1), Sˆ(K + 1)] = KF(Uˆ(K), Sˆ(K), Z,H,Q,R, MZ)
◃Estimate Probability of Conflict using Subset Simulation
17: P (SS)c (K + 1) =PC_SS(f , t, A, O, Uˆ(K + 1), Sˆ(K + 1), N , rt, p0, m)
◃Estimate Probability of Conflict using Direct Monte Carlo
18: P (DMC)c (K + 1) =PC_DMC(f, t, A,O, Uˆ(K + 1), Sˆ(K + 1), N, rt)
19: end for
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